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REAGAN CIVIL RIGHTS: THE FIRST TWENTY
MONTHS
A REPORT BY THE WASHINGTON COUNCIL OF LAWYERS*
PREFACE
This Report reviews the performance of the Justice Depart-
ment's Civil Rights Division since President Reagan's inaugura-
tion. The Division is the Civil Rights backbone of the federal
government, and its activities and policies set the pace not only
for other federal departments, but also for state, local and pri-
vate agencies.
The Report reviews at length the activities of the Division's
sub-units, which are called "Sections." Each Section has primary
responsibility for the enforcement of particular civil rights laws.
The Division's Appellate Section is the only section not individ-
ually reviewed but its influence on policies is noted in connec-
tion with discussions of particular cases.
The report was prepared over a ten month period by eleven
volunteer attorneys of differing backgrounds and experience.
They have done extensive legal research, reviewed public docu-
ments, court filings and official Department of Justice state-
ments. They have also interviewed present and past Civil Rights
Division attorneys and have met with a variety of knowledgeable
people in the civil rights field.
We have made every attempt to keep this Report accurate
and current. But, as is often the case when a volunteer group
attempts to monitor a governmental agency, there may well be
errors of omission. For these we apologize in advance.
*This report was originally issued in September, 1982 as WASHINGTON COUNCIL OF
LAWYERS, REAGAN CIVIL RIGHTS: THE FIRST TWENTY MONTHS, and is reprinted here in
abridged form. The Washington Council of Lawyers is a voluntary, bipartisan bar associ-
ation that has sought, since its creation in 1971, to promote public service and public
interest activities within the legal community. Its membership includes representatives
from private law firms, public interest groups, and governmental agencies.
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On behalf of the Washington Council of Lawyers, our sin-




Soon after becoming Attorney General, William French
Smith promised minority and women's groups that the Justice
Department would continue to enforce vigorously the federal
civil rights laws. Although he warned that the Administration
would change the focus of past civil rights policies, it would, he
said, develop creative new approaches to resolve the problems of
discrimination.1
Despite these assurances, civil rights advocates remained
concerned. To head the Civil Rights Division, the Attorney Gen-
eral selected William Bradford Reynolds, a private practitioner
from Washington, D.C. who readily admitted that he had no
background or expertise in the field. Subsequent appointments
throughout the Department and its Civil Rights Division failed
to include anyone with a civil rights background, nor were any
members of a racial minority appointed to positions of author-
ity. The public statements made by Administration spokesmen
concerning civil rights matters were few and far between, but
those that were issued contained ominous warnings about the
new President's commitment to enforcing federal civil rights
law.
This Report was undertaken to evaluate that effort. Twenty
months into the Reagan Administration, a review of the Civil
Rights Division's activities confirms that the Attorney General's
early promise to vigorously enforce the law has not been
fulfilled.
The Civil Rights Division has long been the centerpiece of
federal civil rights commitment. It is the barometer by which all
federal agencies' activities can be measured. Indeed, the Division
is officially charged with coordinating and reviewing all the civil
rights policies and regulations of most federal departments. This
Report concludes that the Administration has retreated from
well-established, bipartisan civil rights policies that were devel-
1. Remarks of Attorney General William French Smith before the American Law In-
stitute at 9-10 (May 22, 1981).
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oped during both Democratic and Republican Administrations.
At the same time, the Reagan Administration has failed to de-
velop-and implement-cohesive and consistent civil rights poli-
cies, despite its promise to devise creative and innovative solu-
tions to age-old problems. As a result, the Division's line
attorneys have been relegated to the position of a contemporary
army entering sophisticated combat with antiquated weaponry
and technology.
I. THE GENERAL LITIGATION SECTION: FAIR HOUSING AND
EQUAL EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY
The largest, and perhaps most influential, of the Civil
Rights Division's litigating sections is the General Litigation
Section. Its thirty-seven lawyers have the major responsibility
for litigating discrimination cases in the areas of housing, educa-
tion and credit. It assumed its present form in 1978, when the
former Housing and Credit Section merged with the existing Ed-
ucation Section. It is this Section that is the public focus of the
Reagan Administration's efforts to alter the enforcement of civil
rights laws.
A. Fair Housing
1. Introduction: The Continuing Problem of Housing
Discrimination
The Fair Housing Act of 1968 declared it a national policy
"to provide, within constitutional limitations, for fair housing
throughout the United States."' 2 Despite this promise of national
commitment, the reality of racial discrimination in housing per-
sists. For example, a 1979 study by the U.S. Department of
Housing and Urban Development (HUD) found that the
probability of a black homeseeker encountering at least one in-
stance of discrimination in his search for housing is 75% in the
rental market and 48% in the sales market.'
2. 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (1976).
3. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, OFFICE OF POLICY DEVEL-
OPMENT AND RESEARCH, MEASURING RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN AMERICAN HOUSING MAR-
KETS: THE HOUSING MARKETS PRACTICES SURVEY ES-2 (1979). A similar HUD study of
discrimination against Mexican-Americans in the Dallas rental housing market deter-
mined that light-skinned Mexican-Americans were subject to a 65% chance of discrimi-
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This continued racial discrimination in housing has serious
consequences. Experts have estimated that housing discrimina-
tion is a major cause of the increasingly segregated living pat-
terns which dominate our urban areas today.' Largely as a result
of discrimination, not simply differences in income, blacks are
almost twice as likely as the general population to live in sub-
standard housing, and receive an average of 30% less value for
their housing dollar.' Segregated and inferior housing for minor-
ities helps produce segregated and inferior education, employ-
ment, and municipal services in an increasingly vicious cycle."
Despite the promise of fair housing legislation, segregation and
discrimination in housing remain unsolved.
2. Fair Housing Laws and the Role of the Justice Department
The principal weapon in the fight against housing discrimi-
nation, and the primary enforcement tool of the Justice Depart-
ment, is Title VIII of the 1968 Civil Rights Act, also known as
the Fair Housing Act of 1968.' The Act prohibits discrimination
with respect to a wide range of practices, including not only re-
fusals to sell or rent, but also discrimination in financing, bro-
kerage services, advertising, the terms, conditions, and privileges
nation while dark-skinned Mexican-Americans had a 96% chance of experiencing dis-
crimination in seeking rental housing. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN
DEVELOPMENT, OFFICE OF POLICY DEVELOPMENT AND RESEARCH, DISCRIMINATION AGAINST
CHICANOS IN THE DALLAS RENTAL HOUSING MARKET: AN EXPERIMENTAL EXTENSION OF THE
HOUSING MARKET PRACTICES SURVEY (1979). See also Lamb, Housing Discrimination and
Segregation in America: Problematical Dimensions and the Federal Legal Response, 30
CATH. U. L. REV. 363, 374-79 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Lamb]; Hecht, Apartment
Hunting in Black and White, N.Y. Times, May 11, 1978, at A23, col. 6.
4. See, e.g., Muth, Residential Segregation and Discrimination, in PATTERNS OF RA-
CIAL DISCRIMINATION 107, 112, 113 (G. von Furstenberg, B. Harrison & A. Horowitz eds.
1974) [hereinafter cited as PATTERNS]; Lamb, supra note 3, at 376-78.
5. See, e.g., Lamb, supra note 3 at 388-89; Quigley, Racial Discrimination in the
Housing Consumption of Black Households, in PATTERNS, supra note 4, at 121, 122-25,
133.
6. See, e.g., Lamb, supra note 3, at 390-95; U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, EQUAL
OPPORTUNITY IN SUBURBIA 9-15 (1974).
7. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619, 3631 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). Several other laws and con-
stitutional provisions prohibit discrimination related to housing and have been utilized
by the Justice Department, such as the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1691
(1976 & Supp. V 1981), but most federal fair-housing activity has been focused on Title
VIII. See U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE FEDERAL FAIR HOUSING ENFORCEMENT
EFFORT 57-60 (1979) [hereinafter cited as 1979 CRC REPORT].
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of sale, and the provision of related services and facilities.6 Pub-
lic as well as private discrimination is banned, and Title VIII
also bars exclusionary land use controls that discriminate on ra-
cial grounds.'
The Justice Department is the only federal agency empow-
ered to bring enforcement actions under Title VIII.'0 An action
for injunctive relief may be brought whenever there is a "reason-
able cause to believe" that a person is engaged in "a pattern or
practice" of discrimination or such discrimination "raises an is-
sue of general public importance."'" The Department may exer-
cise its authority on the basis of information provided by ag-
grieved individuals or on the basis of its own independent
investigations. Because of its exclusive federal Title VIII en-
forcement responsibility, the role of the Justice Department is
critical to achieving fair housing.
3. Civil Rights Division Fair Housing Efforts Prior to the
Reagan Administration
Under both Republican and Democratic administrations,
the Civil Rights Division has played an important role in fight-
ing housing discrimination. Between 1969 and mid-1978, the
Civil Rights Division brought more than 300 cases against over
800 defendants, averaging approximately 32 cases per year."' In
addition, 36 enforcement proceedings (e.g., for civil contempt or
supplemental relief) were filed.'" Even this quantity of litigation
8. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604-3606 (1976).
9. See 42 U.S.C. § 3615 (1976); see, e.g., United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d
1179 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1042 (1975); Morales v. Raines, 486 F.2d 880
(7th Cir. 1973).
10. HUD has the statutory responsibility to receive and investigate complaints of
housing discrimination, but only has the power to conciliate disputes, not to bring en-
forcement actions. See generally H.R. REP. No. 96-865, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980); RE-
PORT OF THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL, STRONGER FEDERAL ENFORCEMENT NEEDED TO UP-
HOLD FAIR HOUSING LAWS (1978). Private actions may be brought under Title VIII as
well.
11. 42 U.S.C. § 3613 (1976).
12. Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1979: Hearings on H.R. 2540 Before the Sub-
comm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1979) (statement of Drew S. Days III, Assistant Attorney General,





has been characterized, by the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights,
as "somewhat disappointing" in light of the magnitude of the
housing discrimination problem."
However, both the Commission and fair housing advocates
have praised the "high quality" of the Division's housing dis-
crimination efforts prior to the Reagan Administration, both in
its pre-suit investigations and in its actual litigation."6
Perhaps the most notable achievement of the Division has
been its contribution to the development of a body of case law
which has enhanced the effectiveness of Title VIII. For instance,
United States v. City of Black Jack6 was one of the first appel-
late court decisions to apply to housing cases the "effects" test
or "prima facie" concept recognized in employment discrimina-
tion cases. The court in that case adopted the Justice Depart-
ment's position that conduct by a defendant (in that case pas-
sage of a zoning ordinance prohibiting the construction of any
new multiple-family dwellings) which has a discriminatory effect
establishes a prima facie case of discrimination and shifts the
burden of proof to the defendant to justify the ordinance's ra-
cially discriminatory impact. Virtually every other federal appel-
late court has followed Black Jack and has held that the prima
facie case concept is proper under Title VIII.' 7 The "effects"
test was utilized by the Division itself in United States v. City
of Parma's as one basis for obtaining a significant court order
against the exclusionary actions of an Ohio suburb. The relief
included the creation of a fair housing committee within city
government and a requirement that the city seek additional sub-
sidized housing for low and moderate income families.
14. 1979 CRC REPORT, supra note 7, at 71. The Commission cited several factors
which limited the litigation effort: the small size of the housing section, the strict inter-
nal standards for filing suit, and the section's multi-level internal review process. Id. at
72-73. These factors, coupled with the Division's decision to concentrate on more com-
plex cases with more wide-ranging impact in such areas as exclusionary zoning, resulted
in a decrease in the average number of cases filed each year in the 1978-80 period to 19.
See 1979 ATr'Y GEN. ANN. REP. 114; 1980 Arr'Y GEN. ANN. REP. 129.
15. 1979 CRC REPORT, supra note 7, at 70.
16. 508 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1042 (1975).
17. See, e.g., Robinson v. Twelve Lofts Realty, Inc., 610 F.2d 1032, 1038 (2d Cir.
1979); Resident Advisory v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126, 146-48 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435
U.S. 908 (1978); Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. v. Village of Arlington
Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1287-90 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1025 (1978).
18. 494 F. Supp. 1049 (N.D. Ohio 1980), aff'd in part, 661 F.2d 562 (6th Cir. 1981).
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Other important principles established in Division housing
cases include:
(1) A duty by defendants found liable in discrimination
cases to take affirmative steps to correct the effects of their past
discrimination;19
(2) The right of the United States to sue several defendants
operating in the same geographic area as part of a group pattern
or practice even where no defendant had individually engaged in
a pattern and practice and even though the defendants had not
acted in concert;20
(3) The vicarious liability of principals for discriminatory
acts of their agents; 21 and
(4) The liability of newspapers for printing discriminatory
advertisements.2
The performance of the Civil Rights Division in the housing
discrimination area has been characterized as "impressive. "23
The Division's success in building a legal foundation for success-
ful attacks on housing discrimination has earned it bipartisan
praise for making a "significant contribution" to fair housing.
24
4. The Civil Rights Division Under the Reagan Administration
Both fair housing advocates and career Justice Department
attorneys are in agreement that fair housing enforcement by the
Civil Rights Division under the Reagan Administration has dete-
riorated dramatically. This change is most evident in three ar-
eas: new litigation activity, shifts in policy, and conduct of previ-
ously-filed litigation.
19. United States v. West Peachtree Tenth Corp., 437 F.2d 221 (5th Cir. 1971).
20. United States v. Bob Lawrence Realty Co., 474 F.2d 115 (5th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 826 (1973).
21. United States v. Reddoch, 1 E.O.H.C. (P-H) § 13,569 (S.D. Ala. 1972), aff'd, 467
F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1972).
22. United States v. Hunter, 459 F.2d 205 (4th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 934
(1972).
23. U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT EFFORT
57 (1971) [hereinafter cited as 1971 CRC REPORT].
24. Id. at 71.
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a. New Litigation Activity
New fair housing litigation activity under the Reagan Ad-
ministration has come to a virtual standstill. Compared to an
annual average of nineteen new cases in 1978-80 and over thirty-
two new cases in the predominantly Republican years of 1969-
78, only two new fair housing cases have been brought by the
Division since 1980.25 No cases whatsoever were filed until Feb-
ruary, 1982, more than a year after President Reagan took
office.2
Moreover, the two cases finally brought by the Section re-
present a significant departure from its previous strategy to con-
centrate on complex "test" cases. Both cases involve "distinctly
minor suits against individual property management compa-
nies, '27 which were already being sued by local housing groups
in virtually identical suits.
2 8
The Division has claimed that the amicus curiae brief it
filed in the Supreme Court in a housing case, Havens Realty
Corp. v. Coleman,"9 in which the Court affirmed the standing of
"testers" to sue under Title VIII, evidences its continued sup-
port for fair housing. But the facts behind the filing of the brief
belie that claim. In fact, the brief was filed not at the initiative
of the Division, but "only at the insistence" of HUD and despite
the opposition of the Assistant Attorney General William Brad-
ford Reynolds. 80 Although Mr. Reynolds has frequently claimed
in public that many new housing cases are "under investiga-
tion," present and former Division attorneys have reported that
this may mean nothing more than the opening of a new file
when a citizen's complaint is received.
25. Washington Post, Feb. 13, 1982, at E3, col. 1.
26. Washington Post, April 3, 1982, at A15, col. 3 (letter from Martin E. Sloane, Ex-
ecutive Director of the National Committee Against Discrimination in Housing) [herein-
after cited as Sloane Letter].
27. Sloane Letter, supra note 26.
28. Compare Fair Housing Center v. Hartman and Tyner, Inc., No. 8173272 (E.D.
Mich., September 8, 1981) with United States v. Hartman and Tyner, Inc., No. 8271066
(E.D. Mich., March 25 1982); compare also Education/Instruction v. Commonwealth Av-
enue Associates, C.A. No. 81-208-MA (D. Mass. Jan. 29, 1981) with United States v.
Commonwealth Avenue Associates, C.A. No. 82-302-MA (February 4, 1982).
29. 455 U.S. 363 (1982).
30. Sloane Letter, supra note 26.
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b. Policy Changes
According to present and former Division attorneys, includ-
ing the former Chief of the General Litigation Section, Robert
Reinstein, the decline in new Division litigation activity is due
largely to shifts in Division policy. For example, despite previous
Division practice and judicial precedent supporting Title VIII as
a remedy against exclusionary zoning and similar practices
which have significant discriminatory effects, Assistant Attorney
General Reynolds has announced that the Division will no
longer institute such actions. 1
Perhaps even more important, the Division has also aban-
doned the "effects" test, which the Division itself helped to es-
tablish. The courts have recognized that Congress' intent in en-
acting laws against discrimination in employment, housing, and
other areas was to combat the "consequences" of discrimination,
"not simply the motivation"; as the courts have explained, even
discrimination not caused by blatant prejudice "can be as disas-
trous and unfair to private rights and the public interest as the
perversity of a willful scheme." 2 In addition, both courts and
civil rights advocates have emphasized the importance of the
"effects" concept in proving discrimination; as the court suc-
cinctly observed in the Black Jack case, "clever men may easily
conceal their motivations" in discrimination cases.8 Yet the Di-
vision's leaders have apparently forgotten that "sophisticated as
well as simple-minded modes of discrimination" are illegal.34
Top Division officials have criticized the "effects" test,3 5 and Di-
vision attorneys have been told that no new cases employing
that concept will be initiated.
c. Conduct of Pending Litigation
These policy shifts have also affected the Division's conduct
of pending cases. For example, in a case against the City of Yon-
31. National Law Journal, Nov. 9, 1981, at 3, col. 1.
32. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971) (employment). See also Sis-
ters of Providence v. City of Evanston, 335 F. Supp. 396, 404 (N.D. Ill. 1971).
33. United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179, 1185 (8th Cir. 1974) cert.
denied, 422 U.S. 1042 (1975).
34. Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268, 275 (1939).
35. See, e.g., Memorandum from Robert J. D'Agostino to William Bradford Reynolds
(July 21, 1981), reprinted at 127 CONG. REc. H6183 (daily ed. Sept. 14, 1981).
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kers, challenging segregation in education and housing in New
York, the Division has already amended its complaint to elimi-
nate its request that Yonkers remedy affirmatively its previous
housing discrimination, despite the fact that the Division itself
has helped to establish the principle that such relief may be
required.
In addition, Division attorneys report that they have been
instructed not to attempt to utilize the "effects" test in any
pending litigation, and that references to discriminatory effect
are often deleted from briefs and pleadings by the Division
superiors. For example, the Division recently told the court in
United States v. City of Birmingham36 that its case was based
on discriminatory intent and that it was not employing the "ef-
fects" test, despite its recognition that the federal courts of ap-
peal have-upheld this approach. 7 This shift in position contrib-
uted last year to the first defeat the Division has ever sustained
in a Title VIII case against a municipality.3 8
d. Conclusion
Until 1981, both Republican and Democratic administra-
tions had joined in the battle against housing discrimination.
Under the Reagan Administration, however, the Civil Rights Di-
vision has refused to use the very legal doctrines which the Divi-
sion itself has helped establish, and instead has virtually aban-
doned the fight. To date, the Division has proposed no credible
alternatives to the theories it has discarded. Whatever its intent,
the effect of this policy can only be to exacerbate discrimination
in housing across the country.
B. School Desegregation and Equal Educational Opportunity
Historically, the Civil Rights Division's greatest impact has
come in its efforts to achieve equal opportunity and desegrega-
tion in public education. Since 1964, when Congress first author-
ized the Attorney General to commence such litigation, the Divi-
sion has been the single most influential federal agency in
36. No. 80-70991 (E.D. Mich 1982).
37. See also New York Times, Dec. 20, 1981, § 4, at 4, col. 2 (discussing the Yonkers
litigation).
38. See Angell v. Zinsser, 473 F. Supp. 488 (D. Conn. 1981).
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matters of desegregation. It has provided the resources and per-
sonnel to expand desegregation efforts beyond urban areas in
the deep South. It has also forced a succession of Presidents to
commit themselves to full equality in education, and it has ac-
tively involved the entire executive branch in the desegregation
process.
1. The Civil Rights Division Under the Reagan Administration:
"Enforcing" the Law of Desegregation
a. Reinterpreting School Desegregation Law
At the very heart of the Supreme Court's decision in Brown
v. Board of Educations" is the Court's emphatic pronouncement
that "in the field of public education the doctrine of 'separate
but equal' has no place. Separate educational facilities are inher-
ently unequal."' 0 Yet perhaps the most alarming example of the
Civil Rights Division's changes in policy under the Reagan Ad-
ministration is its emerging view that "separate but equal"
schooling, illegal for a generation, has again become acceptable.
Assistant Attorney General Reynolds has announced that
the Division's "future enforcement policies will be aimed" not at
eliminating segregation by all permissible means, but at remedy-
ing "substantial disparities in the tangible components of educa-
tion" between minority and white students.'1 In other words, the
Division's primary goal is to make minority schools "equal" to
white schools even if they remain "separate"-precisely the con-
cept rejected by the Supreme Court in Brown.
The leadership of the Division has also sought to narrowly
redefine what constitutes illegal discrimination. According to the
current Civil Rights Division, "in every case where de jure segre-
gation is established, we will insist on the removal of all official
39. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
40. Id. at 495.
41. Hearings on School Desegregation Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitu-
tional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 619-20 (1981)
(testimony of William Bradford Reynolds) [hereinafter cited as Reynolds Testimony].
See also Summary of Oral Argument by Solicitor General Lee in Crawford v. Board of
Education, 102 S. Ct. 3211 (1982), at 50 U.S.L.W. 3778 (suggesting such measures as
increasing teacher-student ratios and spending more funds as alternatives to court-or-
dered desegregation busing plans).
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impediments to desegregation.' 2 The key words in that sen-
tence are de jure (in law) and "removal" of "official impedi-
ments." Contemporary school boards seeking to segregate thirty
years after Brown will hardly announce their intentions in a
public law or pronouncement. Moreover, the Division's policy
has little application today in areas where decades of school dis-
crimination have created an entrenched pattern of segregation
that "cannot be undone with the stroke of a pen." ' Instead, as
the Supreme Court has emphasized, "affirmative action" is nec-
essary in order to "achieve the greatest possible degree of actual
desegregation" practicable where segregation has taken place."
The Division's policy of simply "removing" official obstacles to
desegregation might have been meaningful in 1955, when many
states still had statutes prohibiting integrated schools. Today it
is empty rhetoric.
b. Failure to Investigate or File New Cases
Since the Reagan Administration took office in January
1981, the Civil Rights Division has not filed a single desegrega-
tion suit. Moreover, Justice Department attorneys claim that the
enforcement situation is even worse than the lack of court filings
would indicate.' 5 Investigation initiatives have been negligible;
no enforcement priorities have been set, and investigations that
were ongoing or nearing completion have received, at best, mini-
mal support."0
42. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, THE CIVIL RIGHTS POLICY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE: A
RESPONSE TO THE LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE ON CIVIL RIGHTS 18 (April 1982) (emphasis in
original) [hereinafter cited as LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE RESPONSE].
43. H.R. REP. No. 12, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (1982) [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP.
No. 12].
44. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1, 28, 26 (1971).
Accord, e.g., Davis v. School Commissioners of Mobile County, 402 U.S. 33, 37 (1971).
45. Wines, Administration Says It Merely Seeks A "Better Way" To Enforce Civil
Rights, 1982 NAT'L J. 536, 539 [hereinafter cited as Wines]. See also Reynolds Testi-
mony, supra note 41, at 624:
At the moment I guess I have been in office about 3 1/2 months, and . . .[w]e
certainly do not have any suits, and we do not really have a full-blown investiga-
tion. This is the preliminary stage of, one, development, and, two, looking over
different school areas to see what would be appropriate, which area it would be
appropriate to move forward in.
Id.
46. H.R. REP. No. 12, supra note 43, at 3, 25.
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Equally disturbing has been the Department's failure to
pursue cases that are fully developed and poised for prosecu-
tion. For example, just before leaving office, former Attorney
General Civiletti wrote a memorandum to the new Attorney
General stating that he was prepared to file suit against more
than twenty suburban school districts in the St. Louis area, but
that he felt the case needed the support of the new administra-
tion.48 The Division has since failed to take any such action.
Furthermore, the Division has refused to appeal cases, de-
spite an arguable likelihood of success, in which the courts have
ruled against positions advocated during the previous adminis-
trations. In Houston, the Division has abandoned its earlier ef-
forts to seek a metropolitan desegregation remedy, following dis-
missal of its case at the district court level.' 9
The Department's "hands-off" policy is also reflected in its
willingness to settle cases with minimal compromise on the part
of the school systems. 50 A related symptom is the Division's in-
difference to violations of existing court orders.8 1
The long-run implications of the Department's negligible
enforcement efforts are alarming. As the Civil Rights Division
refrains from filing any new cases and systematically settles
those which are pending, it will soon be left with little or no case
load, and a major force in desegregation will have been effec-
tively eliminated. Ultimately, the "non-enforcement" policy
amounts to a simple declaration that the problem has disap-
peared and therefore nothing further needs to be done. In so
concluding, the Division is either ignoring reality or completely
surrendering to anti-desegregation forces. "[T]he Civil Rights
Division now has become a negative force, providing solace to
those who have violated and will continue to violate among the
most important laws of this nation." 2
47. See H.R. REP. No. 12, supra note 43, at 25.
48. See Washington Post, June 4, 1981, at A2, col. 1.
49. See Letter from U.S. Commission on Human Rights to President Reagan 9 (Feb.
12, 1982); Memorandum & Order, Ross v. Houston Indep. School Dist., Civ. Action No.
10444 (S.D. Tex. June 17, 1981); on remand from Houston Ind. School District v. Ross,
282 F.2d 95 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 803 (1960); N.Y. Times, Aug. 28, 1981, at
A10, col. 2.
50. See Wines, supra note 45, at 539.
51. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Feb. 14, 1982, at 35, col. 1.
52. H.R. REP. No. 12, supra note 43, at 25.
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c. Refusal to Seek Effective Remedies
The leadership of the Division has sought to characterize
the dispute between itself and its critics as a simple disagree-
ment over what remedies should be pursued in school desegrega-
tion cases, not over basic questions of "enforcement of civil
rights."3 As the Supreme Court ruled almost a century ago,
however, to eliminate all effective remedies for the enforcement
of a right is "to take away the right itself."' The record reveals
that this is precisely the course on which the Division has em-
barked in five specific areas. The areas are: repudiation of
mandatory student reassignment plans, reliance upon purely
voluntary efforts, refusal to seek system-wide remedies, disa-
vowal of the affirmative duty to desegregate, and refusal to fol-
low court standards for desegregation in higher education.
i. Repudiation of Mandatory Reassignment Plans as a Remedy
to Achieve Desegregation
Of primary concern, is the Justice Department's wholesale
abandonment of the use of mandatory student reassignment
plans and "busing" as a legitimate and effective tool to imple-
ment desegregation. Despite the Department's consistent posi-
tion to the contrary over the last two decades, both Mr. Reyn-
olds and Attorney General Smith have announced unequivocally
their repudiation of this remedy under all circumstances.
The Department's anti-busing policy flies in the face of Su-
preme Court rulings that "[a]n absolute prohibition against use
of [reassignment plans]-even as a starting point-contravenes
the implicit command of Green v. County School Board . . .
that all reasonable methods be available to formulate an effec-
tive remedy." 6 Indeed, the Court has recognized for segregated
schools in many cases that "it is unlikely that a truly effective
remedy could be devised without continued reliance upon [bus-
ing]."' As the Supreme Court cautioned in Swann v. Charlotte-
53. LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE RESPONSE, supra note 42, at 22 (emphasis in original).
54. Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 270, 303 (1885).
55. North Carolina State Board of Education v. Swann, 402 U.S. 43, 46 (1971).
56. See also H.R. REP. No. 12, supra note 43, at 19 (concluding that "busing achieves
a degree of desegregation that is unattainable through other means").
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Mecklenberg Board of Education,57 "[d]esegregation plans can-
not be limited to the walk-in school." Apparently, the Assistant
Attorney General has attempted to do precisely that.
The Department's opposition to busing demonstrates
wholesale reversal by the Division leadership of the positions
previously advanced by both Republican and Democratic admin-
istrations, often in the very cases at issue, and a serious retreat
in civil rights enforcement.
ii. Reliance Upon Purely Voluntary Programs
Another persistent theme of the current Civil Rights Divi-
sion is the notion that any progress toward desegregation may
be conducted only on a purely voluntary basis. Mr. Reynolds has
testified, "I don't think. . . that the Government can compel an
integrated education. . . . [W]e are not going to compel children
who do not want to choose to have integrated education to have
one."58 This statement captures the essence of the Department's
policy, and indicates how far it has moved from the Brown
principles.
Such a policy is utterly devoid of support in the law. The
Supreme Court has never left any doubt that desegregation is
constitutionally mandated."' This mandate cannot be satisfied
by offering children and their parents the "option" of choosing
an integrated education, as Reynolds has proposed." As the
Court stated in Green v. County School Board, "the burden on a
school board today is to come forward with a plan that promises
to work realistically now . . . [I]f there are reasonably available
other ways . . . promising speedier and more effective conver-
sion to a unitary, non-racial system, 'freedom of choice' must be
held unacceptable."' 1
Moreover, the Department's eagerness to embrace "volun-
tary" programs as an acceptable alternative to busing appears
either hopelessly naive or subtly disingenuous. A generation of
experience with desegregation efforts and experiments has
demonstrated fairly conclusively that voluntary or optional
57. 402 U.S. 1, 30 (1971).
58. Reynolds Testimony, supra note 41, at 631.
59. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
60. Reynolds Testimony, supra note 41, at 631-32.
61. 391 U.S. 430, 439, 441 (1968).
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transfer programs are simply ineffective in promoting any signif-
icant degree of desegregation. 2 The Supreme Court itself has
commented that "the general experience under 'freedom of
choice' to date has been such as to indicate its ineffectiveness as
a tool of desegregation."I s The Division has demonstrated a
readiness to place its faith in voluntary compliance programs de-
spite long histories of such programs' failure.
iii. Refusal to Seek System-Wide Remedies
Another critical area in which the current Administration
has repudiated long-standing Supreme Court precedent and Di-
vision practice is the Department's refusal to seek implementa-
tion of desegregation programs on a district-wide basis. The Su-
preme Court in Keyes v. School District No. 164 laid down a
presumption that if a substantial portion of a particular school
district is shown to be impermissibly segregated, a system-wide
remedy must be imposed encompassing all schools within that
district. In other words, the government need not prove that
each individual school is intentionally segregated.
The Assistant Attorney General has announced that he will
refuse to abide by the Supreme Court's ruling in Keyes. "In de-
ciding to initiate litigation, we will not rely on the Keyes pre-
sumption, but will define the violation precisely and seek to
limit the remedy only to those schools in which racial imbalance
is the product of intentionally segregative acts of State offi-
cials."66 Although Mr. Reynolds has conceded that Keyes creates
an automatically triggered presumption,66 he has also attempted
to argue that Keyes does not really mandate such a presump-
tion, but merely offers the presumption as an option that the
Justice Department may choose to exercise if it desires.6 7 Appar-
ently, Mr. Reynolds believes that the Supreme Court's holding
in Keyes is "unfair," 6 and therefore he refuses to abide by it.6 9
62. See H.R. REP. No. 12, supra note 43, at 19, 21-22.
63. 391 U.S. at 440.
64. 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
65. Reynolds Testimony, supra note 41, at 618.
66. Id. at 617, 622.
67. See id. at 622.
68. Id. at 618.
69. See generally LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE ON CIVIL RIGHTS, WITHOUT JUSTICE (Feb.
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This shift in policy has more than theoretical importance.
By seeking relief in only part of a school system where segrega-
tion has occurred, the Division will encourage residential insta-
bility and "white flight" as parents seek to transfer their chil-
dren to schools unaffected by desegregation. In addition,
meaningful desegregation may often be impossible if only a frac-
tion of a school district is involved. The Division's new policy,
therefore, can lead only to unstable and ineffective attempts at
desegregation which the Division's own leadership has decried.70
iv. Disavowal of the Affirmative Duty by School Boards to
Dismantle Dual Systems
It is now well established that school board officials have an
affirmative constitutional obligation to act promptly to "eradi-
cate the effects" of past unlawful segregation. 7' The school dis-
trict must ensure that student assignment policies do not have
the effect of perpetuating or reestablishing a segregated sys-
tem. 2 In discharging this "affirmative duty," school boards must
employ "whatever steps might be necessary" to eradicate dis-
crimination.78 "Conscientious efforts ' 74 are not enough; contrary
to the Department's assertions, 5 the Supreme Court has held
that compliance will be measured according to the effectiveness
of the programs, not simply the degree of good intentions.7 6
School districts guilty of unlawful segregation must take affirma-
tive steps to achieve the "greatest possible degree of actual
desegregation."7
Nevertheless, Justice Department officials have disavowed
the existence of any such affirmative duty. Assistant Attorney
General Reynolds has suggested that school officials have no ob-
ligation to provide desegregated schools for all students. His
1982) [hereinafter cited as LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE REPORT]. This obvious repudiation
of the law was criticized in the LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE REPORT, but the issue was not
addressed by the Justice Department in its April 3, 1982 response to the REPORT.
70. See H.R. REP. No. 12, supra note 43, at 24.
71. Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman (II), 443 U.S. 526, 537 (1979).
72. Columbus Board of Education v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 460 (1979).
73. Green v. County School Board, 391 U.S. 439, 437, 440 (1968).
74. LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE RESPONSE, supra note 42, at 14.
75. Id. at 12.
76. Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman (II), 443 U.S. at 538.
77. Davis, 402 U.S. at 37.
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view is that they are merely required to refrain from hindering
whatever degree of integration might naturally occur on its
own." But this approach impermissibly shifts to parents and
children the responsibility for initiating desegregation, a duty
which the Supreme Court has held rests "squarely on the School
Board.
'7 9
v. Refusal to Follow Court-Ordered Standards for Higher
Education Segregation
The Division's refusal to seek effective remedies for past
state-imposed segregation is aptly illustrated by its higher edu-
cation cases. The Division has taken the position that a large
degree of segregation in state higher education systems is tolera-
ble, as long as certain steps are taken to equalize the quality of
the schools. 0 While upgrading the quality of traditionally un-
derfunded schools is certainly important, the problem is that, in
the higher education context, "equalization" combined with an
open admissions policy often has the effect of perpetuating and
reinforcing existing segregation,"' a result that is just as illegal as
segregation at the pre-college level under Brown. "Where an
open admissions policy neither produces the required desegrega-
tion nor promises realistically to do so, something further is
required.
'8 2
Pursuant to a 1977 court order in Adams v. Califano,83 the
Department of Health, Education and Welfare adopted a num-
ber of criteria for determining the acceptability of higher educa-
tion desegregation plans. These requirements include specific
steps to integrate students, faculty, and staff, and to eliminate
unnecessary program duplication as between black and white
schools (analogous to the magnet school concept).8" The exis-
tence of program duplication leaves students with no incentive
78. Reynolds Testimony, supra note 41, at 631-34.
79. Green v. County School Board, 391 U.S. 430, 441-42 (1968).
80. See LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 69, at 26.
81. See generally U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE BLACK/WHITE COLLEGES:
DISMANTLING THE DUAL SYSTEM OF HIGHER EDUCATION (April 1981).
82. Geier v. University of Tennessee, 597 F.2d 1056 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 886 (1979).
83. 430 F. Supp. 119 (D.D.C. 1977).
84. See 43 Fed. Reg. 6658 (1978).
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to cross traditional racial barriers, and therefore deprives schools
of the ability to attract an integrated student body.
However, the current Civil Rights Division has refused even
to abide by the minimal standards required by the court order
in Adams. In Louisiana and North Carolina, for example, where
major efforts had been underway to dismantle dual systems of
higher education, the Justice Department and the Department
of Education have now reversed their positions and have
dropped the pending suits. The Department has agreed to re-
quire that traditionally black institutions be upgraded, but in
the process, has allowed a substantial increase in the degree of
program duplication, thus ultimately perpetuating and reinforc-
ing the status quo. Indeed, the United States Commission on
Civil Rights and the NAACP Legal Defense Fund have charged
that these settlements violate the Adams criteria.8 5 In response,
the Justice Department has argued that the standards are mer-
ely flexible guidelines, which the Department may choose not to
follow, and that the standards are inapplicable once settlement
discussions have begun."6 But the Department's interpretation
completely undermines the purpose of the Adams criteria-to
articulate standards so that those affected would have notice of
their rights and responsibilities.87 If the Department may choose
selectively whether or not to enforce the standards, states will
abandon further compliance efforts as they perceive the increas-
ing likelihood that noncompliance will be tolerated.
Furthermore, the Department's novel "settlement" excep-
tion to the Adams requirements is an unheard of legal position
likely to be transported to other areas. In effect, says the Divi-
sion, a state may circumvent desegregation standards entirely by
simply refusing to desegregate until the Division is forced to file
suit, and then settling on its own terms. Such a policy signals a
further retreat from effective civil rights enforcement.
85. See Letter from U.S. Commission on Civil Rights to President Reagan 7 (Feb. 12,
1982); Adams v. Bell, 711 F.2d 161 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
86. See Brief for Appellee at 31-36, Adams v. Bell, 711 F.2d 161 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
87. See Adams v. Richardson, 480 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
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d. Reinstatement of Tax Exemptions for Discriminatory
Private Schools
Finally, the Department has repudiated yet another long-
standing legal position by its sudden willingness to extend tax
exempt "charitable" status to racially discriminatory private
schools. Although the Internal Revenue Service allowed segre-
gated private schools to claim tax deductions prior to 1970, the
Supreme Court in 1971 affirmed the issuance of a permanent in-
junction prohibiting the IRS from continuing such a policy.88
While the injunction itself applied only to Mississippi, the IRS
had already formally extended the non-discrimination policy to
all schools, requiring proof that programs and facilities are oper-
ated in a non-discriminatory manner before a school may be
deemed "charitable" under § 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue
Code.8"
The Reagan Administration, however, has jettisoned this le-
gal position in the wake of a challenge by two schools that had
been denied tax exemptions by the IRS.'0 After the Fourth Cir-
cuit upheld the statutory and constitutional authority behind
the IRS rulings, and the Supreme Court had granted certiorari
to review the cases, the Justice Department reversed its position
and urged the Supreme Court to drop the cases, because the ad-
ministration had decided to allow the segregated schools to be
tax exempt, 1 despite the government's own characterization of
the schools as "blatantly discriminatory.' 2 For example, though
Bob Jones University has admitted black students since 1975,
the school prohibits interracial mixing or dating."
The Department's reversal is not only without legal justifi-
88. Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150 (D.D.C. 1971), aff'd sub. nom. Coit v. Green
404 U.S. 997 (1971) (per curiam).
89. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 639 F.2d 147, 150 (4th Cir. 1981), afid, 103
S. Ct. 2017 (1983).
90. See Bob Jones University v. United States, 639 F.2d 147 (4th Cir. 1980), aff'd,
103 S. Ct. 2017 (1983); Goldsboro Christian Schools, Inc. v. United States, 436 F. Supp.
1314 (E.D.N.C. 1977), aff'd mem., 644 F.2d 879 (4th Cir. 1981), aff'd, 103 S. Ct. 2017
(1983).
91. The D.C. Circuit has temporarily enjoined the IRS and the Treasury Department
from restoring the tax exemptions. Wright v. Regan, 49 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) 82-757 (D.C.
Cir. 1982); see 656 F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 3109 (1983).
92. See Washington Post, Jan. 9, 1982, at Al, col. 1.
93. 639 F.2d at 149.
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cation, but it also raises "serious constitutional questions,"" as
it would have the effect of providing substantial economic bene-
fits from the government to large numbers of discriminatory and
segregated schools. As a matter of statutory interpretation, the
racial policies of the schools in question preclude them from
qualifying as "charitable" under the Internal Revenue Code be-
cause they stand in violation of "clearly defined public policy.""
Neither the Free Exercise Clause nor the Establishment Clause
of the First Amendment confers on discriminatory schools a
right to tax exemptions. The government's compelling interest
in eliminating all forms of racial discrimination, whether "gov-
ernmental or private, absolute or conditional, -contractual or as-
sociational," outweighs any additional burden on the schools re-
sulting from a denial of tax-exempt status.9 Indeed, the
Establishment Clause prohibits government subsidization of ra-
cist religious beliefs by means of tax exemptions.
9 7
In reversing its position, the Department rejected the statu-
tory basis for the Fourth Circuit holding, and ignored the Su-
preme Court's decision in the Green case. The about-face was
apparently engineered by Mr. Reynolds despite doubts else-
where within the Administration regarding the propriety and le-
gal basis for his position. Ultimately, the White House was
caught in an embarrassing series of inconsistent explanations
about the change in policy, further revealing the fundamentally
political nature of the decision."
II. THE VOTING SECTION-VOTING RIGHTS
A. Introduction
The Voting Section of the Civil Rights Division is responsi-
ble for enforcing the Voting Rights Act of 1965.99 Pursuant to its
obligations under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, the Voting
94. Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. at 1164.
95. Bob Jones University v. United States, 639 F.2d 147, 151 (4th Cir. 1980), a/I'd,
103 S. Ct. 2017 (1983); Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. at 1156-60.
96. Bob Jones University v. United States, 639 F.2d 147, 153 (4th Cir. 1980), af'd,
103 S. Ct. 2017 (1983).
97. See id. at 152 n.7.
98. See generally Washington Post, Feb. 3, 1982, at Al, col. 4; Washington Post, Feb.
2, 1982, at Al, col. 4.
99. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1971-1973bb-1 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
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Section analyzes requests by covered jurisdictions for
preclearance of state and local election-related practices or pro-
cedures. Where revisions in election practices or procedures
could undercut minority voter participation or dilute minority
voting strength, the Voting Section recommends that the Attor-
ney General object to such changes. The Voting Section also
seeks to enforce the Voting Rights Act by participating as an
amicus curiae in private litigation under the Act and by filing
vote dilution cases as a party plaintiff.
During the 97th Congress, an extension of the Voting Rights
Act was considered and eventually enacted into law. In the de-
bate before Congress, the Administration's initial position, as
represented by Attorney General Smith and Assistant Attorney
General Reynolds, was opposed by every interested civil rights
group.
On the enforcement front, the Voting Section has continued
to review, and has objected to, several preclearance filings pursu-
ant to Section 5 of the Act. However, Justice Department partic-
ipation as an amicus curiae in private Voting Rights Act litiga-
tion has declined, and the Department has changed its position
or discontinued participation as an amicus in several important
cases. No vote dilution cases have been filed.
B. The Debate Over the Voting Rights Act Extension
In enacting the Voting Rights Act of 1965, Congress was
fully aware that its previous efforts to ensure the protection and
enforcement of the voting rights of minorities had been ineffec-
tive, and that "through unremitting and ingenious defiance of
the Constitution" several states had deprived blacks of the
franchise.100 Congress recognized that absent determined federal
participation, the Fifteenth Amendment's guarantees against
discrimination in voting would not be enforced.101 Accordingly,
the Voting Rights Act of 1965 established broad prohibitions
against voting discrimination, abolished various tests and quali-
fications for voting and, most important, created novel and so-
phisticated mechanisms for enforcement of the Act by the De-
100. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 309 (1966).
101. Id. See also Christopher, The Constitutionality of the Voting Rights Act of
1965, 18 STAN. L. REV. 1, 1-9 (1965).
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partment of Justice and private parties.10 2 The "extraordinary"
enforcement mechanisms adopted by Congress, which are tem-
porary and apply only to jurisdictions with a history of discrimi-
nation in voting,1"3 were necessitated by the covered states' at-
tempts to evade the Fifteenth Amendment's prohibition against
discrimination in voting.10
1. The Voting Rights Act of 1965
The Voting Rights Act of 1965 has been hailed as one of the
most important civil rights bills ever enacted by Congress. Like
previous voting rights legislation, the 1965 Act broadly prohibits
discrimination in voting and abolishes all discriminatory tests
and devices.'0 The difference between the 1965 Act and its
predecessors is in the former's structure and enforcement. The
Act incorporates a novel mechanism to enforce the broad
prohibitions on voting discrimination: section 5 requires jurisdic-
tions with a history of voting discrimination to "pre-clear" with
the Justice Department all changes in election laws.'06
The Act includes three major provisions. First, section 2 of
the Act prohibits the imposition of any practice, procedure, or
test which has the effect of denying or abridging the right of any
citizen to vote on account of race, color, or membership in a lan-
guage minority group.10 7 Congress specifically abolished the use
of any "test or device" in voting.'08 The term "test or device"
includes literacy tests, educational requirements, "good charac-
ter" tests, and, in jurisdictions where a language minority group
comprises more than 50% of the voting age population, registra-
tion procedures or elections conducted solely in the English
102. Id. at 9-15.
103. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1976).
104. See Christopher, supra note 101, at 1-9; Derfner, Racial Discrimination and the
Right to Vote, 27 VAND. L. REV. 523 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Derfner]; Roman, Sec-
tion 5 of the Voting Rights Act: The Formation of the Extraordinary Federal Remedy,
22 AM. U. L. REV. 111, 125 (1972).
105. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1973-1973bb-1 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
106. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1976). See LAUGHLIN, VOTING RIGHTS IN THE SOUTH: TEN
YEARS OF LITIGATION CHALLENGING CONTINUING DISCRIMINATION AGAINST MINORITIES 16
(1982) [hereinafter cited as LAUGHLIN].
107. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1976).




Second, in connection with jurisdictions where voting dis-
crimination had been flagrant, section 5 of the Act establishes
temporary, extraordinary remedies without any need for prior
adjudication." 0 The states of Alaska, Alabama, Arizona, Geor-
gia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, Texas and Virginia
are covered by section 5, as are counties or towns in thirteen
other states."' These jurisdictions are prohibited from adopting
any change in their election laws without obtaining the prior ap-
proval of the Attorney General or the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia.
' 12
Third, the Act permits the Attorney General to send federal
examiners and observers to certain jurisdictions to protect the
right to vote.1"
On two occasions before 1982, in 1970 and 1975, Congress
examined the progress made under the 1965 Act and extended
it. Those extensions brought additional jurisdictions under the
Act's special provisions and extended these provisions until Au-
gust of 1982."'
Although no one would dispute that substantial gains in mi-
nority voting have occurred as a result of the 1965 Act and its
amendments, the evidence demonstrates that a wide disparity
between minority group registration and white registration still
109. Id.
110. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1976). See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 309
(1966).
111. 28 C.F.R. § 51 (Appendix) (1983). See LAUGHLIN, supra note 106, at 16.
112. 42 U.S.C. 9 1973c (1976).
113. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973d, 1973f (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
114. The 1970 amendments brought within coverage of the Act until August 1975,
counties in New York, Wyoming, California, Alaska, and Arizona, and towns in Connect-
icut, New Hampshire, Maine, and Massachusetts. The 1975 amendments extended the
Act for seven years, made permanent the nationwide ban on literacy tests and other
devices, and extended coverage of the Act to protect language minority citizens from
disenfranchisement. Additional jurisdictions subject to preclearance of election changes
affecting language and other minority citizens as a result of the 1975 amendments in-
cluded the states of Alaska, Arizona, and Texas, counties in California, Colorado, Flor-
ida, North Carolina, South Dakota, and townships in Michigan. Where discrimination in
voting against language minority citizens was less severe, Congress required that lan-
guage assistance be provided in the electoral process. Jurisdictions affected by this re-
quirement included all 143 counties in Texas, all 32 counties in New Mexico, all 14 coun-
ties in Arizona, 39 counties in California, 34 in Colorado, and 25 in Oklahoma.
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exists.' "18 Thus, the Voting Rights Act, facing an August 1982 ex-
piration date, was the first civil rights issue to confront the Rea-
gan Administration when it took office. Its response was less
than comforting to civil rights proponents.
2. The 1982 Extension
During the House Judiciary Committee's consideration of
the Act's extension, the Administration refrained from taking
any position on the legislation. Although Justice Department
representatives were invited to testify, no one representing the
Administration appeared during any of the Committee's eigh-
teen days of hearings."'
On October 5, 1981, the House passed H.R. 3112, by a vote
of 389 to 24. H.R. 3112 extended the Voting Rights Act with two
major amendments. The first was a change in section 2 of the
Act to clarify that proof of discriminatory purpose or intent is
not required in lawsuits brought under that section." 7 The sec-
ond amendment involved a series of changes to section 4(a),
which permits covered jurisdictions to apply for removal from
the Act's provisions.
The amendment to section 2 was intended to clarify the
Congressional intent that effects, not motives, were the key fac-
115. Prior to 1965, the percentage of black registered voters in covered states was
29% while white registration was 73%. Today, black registration has increased so that in
many covered states it stands near 50%; Hispanic registration in Texas has increased by
two-thirds. However, white registration continues to outpace minority registration. Fur-
ther, the number of minority elected officials remains a fraction of the total number of
elected officials. See generally HOUSE JUDICIARY COMM., REPORT ON THE VOTING RIGHTS
ACT EXTENSION, H.R. REP. No. 227, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 7-11 (1981); U.S. COMMISSION
ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT: UNFULFILLED GOALS (1981).
116. See generally LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 69. Chapter 4 of the
LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE REPORT states that the Justice Department declined to testify
before the Committee because it was preparing an analysis for the President.
117. Section 2 of H.R. 3112 provides:
No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or proce-
dure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision in a man-
ner which results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of the
United States on account of race or color, or in contravention of the guarantees
set forth in section 4(f)(2). The fact that members of a minority group have not
been elected in numbers equal to the group's proportion of the population shall
not, in and of itself, constitute a violation of this section.
H.R. 3112, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
19831
HUMAN RIGHTS ANNUAL
tors.1 18 It was this proposal that was seized upon by opponents
of the Act.
Throughout the debate before the Judiciary Committee and
the House itself, these opponents argued that a "results" or "ef-
fects" test, rather than an "intent" test, would for some reason
create a right to proportional representation as a remedy, i.e.,
that a minority must be represented in elective offices in propor-
tion to its numbers in the voting community. Both the language
of section 2 in H.R. 3112 and the House Report address that
concern in clear language:
The proposed amendment does not create a right of pro-
portional representation. Thus, the fact that members of
a racial or language minority group have not been elected
in numbers equal to the group's proportion of the popu-
lation does not, in itself, constitute a violation of the sec-
tion although such proof, along with other objective fac-
tors, would be highly relevant. Neither does it create a
right to proportional representation as a remedy." 9
When the Senate began to consider the Voting Rights Act,
the Administration finally took a position. Despite the clear lan-
guage of the House Report, the Administration opposed changes
in section 2 and favored a simple ten-year extension of the
Act.120 In arguing against the House-passed version of section 2,
Attorney General Smith claimed that a "results" or "effects"
test would cause years of extended litigation whenever election
results, redistricting and reapportionment plans "fail to mirror
the population makeup in a particular community.
118. H.R. REP. No. 227, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 29-30 (1981).
119. Id. See also supra note 117 for Section 2 language in H.R. 3112.
120. The Administration also supported amending the criteria of H.R. 3112 to ease
covered jurisdictions' ability to be removed from coverage under the Act. However, as
the debate over the Voting Rights Act extension evolved, the Administration focused on
section 2, rather than the removal provisions. This chapter thus has the same focus,
although it is important to note that the Administration did seek to weaken the removal
criteria provisions by permitting removals based on a showing that a jurisdiction was in
full compliance with the Act for a period of less than ten years, the time period for
compliance included in H.R. 3117.
121. Bills to Amend the Voting Rights Act of 1965: Hearings on S53, S1761, S1992
and H.E. 3112 Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the Senate Comm. of the
Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 66 (1982) (testimony of Attorney General William French
Smith).
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The Administration also took its campaign to the press. In
"Op-Ed" pieces printed in the New York Times and the Wash-
ington Post, the Attorney General criticized the House bill as "a
hastily devised smokescreen" for a drastic change in the law that
would "compel reorganization of electoral systems to guarantee"
proportional representation.122
The Administration's position, which it urged on the Senate
and the press, was that a simple, ten-year extension of the Act
was all that was necessary to continue to implement the goals of
the original 1965 Act. The Senate Subcommittee agreed with the
Administration, and adopted a simple, ten-year extension of the
Act on March 24, 1982.
At the full Committee, however, the controversy over sec-
tion 2 continued. Finally, a bipartisan compromise was fash-
ioned: the purpose of the House amendment would be incorpo-
rated into a bill acceptable to a majority of the Senate Judiciary
Committee, but specific language would be added to section 2
itself to clarify that there was not established a right to propor-
tional representation. On May 4, 1982, the full Judiciary Com-
mittee adopted S. 1992, with an amendment offered by Senator
Dole containing the section 2 compromise. Despite the clear lan-
guage of the House-passed version-which did not include a
right to proportionate representation-the Administration con-
tinued to characterize the "liberal [House] version" as "incorpo-
rating the highly offensive concept of proportional representa-
tion based on race. ' 123 The Administration's characterization
gave credibility to a false interpretation of the House bill and,
until the Dole compromise, threatened to undo the substantial
progress that has resulted from the Voting Rights Act.
Here, as in other disputed civil rights issues, the Reagan
Administration attempted to mollify its critics on the pretense
that it was engaged in a principled legal dispute. All it really
accomplished, of course, was to obtain a bill that was, for all
intents and purposes, not substantively different than the "lib-
eral" House version. It took them seventeen months to achieve a
routine and common legislative compromise: making explicit
122. Washington Post, March 29, 1982, at All, col. 1; N.Y. Times, March 27, 1982, at
A23, col. 2.
123. Reynolds, Letter to the Editor, Washington Post, May 31, 1982, at A16, col. 3.
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that which was already implicit. Given that no one was advocat-
ing "proportionate representation," this delay raises questions
about the Administration's own "intent."
C. Enforcement of the Voting Rights Act
In defense of the Justice Department's enforcement record
of the Voting Rights Act, Assistant Attorney General Reynolds
has claimed that the Voting Rights Section has "reviewed more
than 8,400 electoral changes" and "participated in litigation in
twenty-seven court cases seeking to assure minority voting
rights" and that "the level of activity in the Division in the past
year far exceeds previous years." 2' Reynolds' assertions were re-
peated in the Justice Department's response to the Leadership
Conference Report, with the additional claim that "the level of
the Department's activity in reviewing and challenging redis-
tricting plans in 1981 is without precedent."' 25 These claims are
clearly impressive and paint a picture of the Justice Department
vigorously and effectively protecting the voting rights of
minorities.
However, upon closer examination, a different picture
emerges, primarily because the facts cited by the Civil Rights
Division are highly misleading though technically accurate. For
instance, only two of the twenty-seven cases in which the Divi-
sion has "participated" were initiated during this Administra-
tion. In addition, in several cases initiated by the previous ad-
ministration, the Reagan Administration has remained active in
the case, but has changed its legal position. Thus, in a case in-
volving the electoral process in Lockhart, Texas which was de-
cided in favor of the United States during the Carter Adminis-
tration, on appeal to the Supreme Court the present
Administration has filed a brief supporting the views of the dis-
senting judge, and urging that the judgment be vacated. 2 6 In
other cases the Justice Department's "participation" is as defen-
dant in declaratory judgment actions brought by state or local
jurisdictions seeking approval of their plans. In still others it is
124. Speech of Assistant Attorney General Reynolds to the Delaware Bar Associa-
tion, February 22, 1982 at 6-7.
125. LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE RESPONSE, supra note 42, at 40.
126. Brief for the United States at 7, City of Lockhart v. United States, 103 S. Ct.
998 (1983).
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as an amicus curiae in lawsuits brought by private plaintiffs.
Further, the two cases initiated by this Administration were rou-
tine section 5 enforcement actions in Louisville, Mississippi and
Sumter County, Alabama. The Department has not yet filed any
"major" (e.g. vote dilution) cases.
By contrast, in its first year in office the previous adminis-
tration filed several section 5 enforcement actions and defended
several other cases. It also initiated lawsuits challenging as un-
constitutional the following practices: at-large elections systems
(Uvalde, Texas), multi-member election systems for school
boards (East Baton Rouge Parish, Louisiana), mis-apportion-
ment of aldermanic wards (Kosciusko, Mississippi), and
problems in voter registration at predominantly black colleges
(Waller County, Texas). In addition, it participated as interven-
ors or as amici in other cases challenging practices such as: at at-
large system for electing selectmen (West Point, Mississippi), at-
large elections for the Parish Council (Plaquemines Parish, Lou-
isiana), misapportionment of parish districts (Winn Parish, Lou-
isiana), minority language voter registration problems (San
Francisco, California), at-large elections under a commission
form of government (Shreveport, Louisiana and Mobile, Ala-
bama), and at-large elections for city commissioners (Albany,
Georgia). The difference in the level and quality of activity is
startling.
Mr. Reynolds' claim that the Justice Department has "re-
viewed" over 8,400 electoral changes is similarly misleading. The
courts have interpreted section 5 to require submission to the
Justice Department of changes which alter the election laws "in
even a minor way" to give section 5 the "broadest possible
scope."'12 7 In previous years, changes submitted to the Justice
Department ranged from 2,078 in 1975 to 7,472 in 1976 to 7,340
in 1980.128 Most significant, the 1980 Census has necessitated
large scale redistricting and other electoral changes due to popu-
lation growth and flux. Thus, the figures cited by Mr. Reynolds
merely indicate an increase in the numbers of submissions to the
127. Allen v. State Board of Education, 393 U.S. 544 (1969). See generally McCoon,
The Enforcement of the Preclearance Requirement of Section 5 of the Voting Rights
Act of 1965, 29 CATH. U. L. REV. 107, 110-14 (1979).
128. U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT: UNFULFILLED
GOALS, at 66, Table 6.1 (September 1981).
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Justice Department. "Review" by the Justice Department,
though crucial under section 5, is an obligatory and involuntary
act. It reflects no policy decision or activity initiated by the
Division.
The claims concerning the number of objections to redis-
tricting plans are more difficult to evaluate. Interestingly, the
Division's objections have been to redistricting plans drawn up
by Democratic controlled state legislatures in Texas, Virginia,
North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Arizona, Alabama and
New York City. Thus, although minority groups clearly benefit
from the objections, the potential benefit to the Republican
Party cannot be ignored. For instance, in connection with the
North Carolina congressional redistricting plan, Republican
State Senator Cary D. Allred objected successfully to Justice De-
partment approval of the plan, in part on the grounds that the
proposed plan "minimizes the influence of the Republican Party
in Alamance County because there are no effective Republican
Organizations in most of the other counties of the Second Dis-
trict of the ratified plan of 1981. "1129 The Civil Rights Division
nevertheless denies charges of "political intervention."
Equally disturbing are those areas in which the Section has
not been active. It has filed but two relatively minor cases in
eighteen months, and has failed to file a single major case deal-
ing with the pressing problems of "vote dilution." Although
there exist notorious examples of covered jurisdictions failing to
submit section 5 preclearance requests, the Division has made
no attempt to undertake an affirmative identification or enforce-
ment program, imposing the burden on private parties to en-
force voting rights.3 0 And, although it claims to be innundated
with preclearance requests, there has been no significant in-
crease in the Section's strength, nor do its budgetary requests
reflect much future expansion."'
Thus, as in the other Sections, the day to day business of
enforcing the Voting Rights Act seems to go on. But the agenda
is filled mostly by old litigation and mandatory section 5 re-
views. There is no new activity and little appears on the horizon.
129. Letter from Cary A. Allred to the Dept. of Justice (August 5, 1981).
130. U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT BUDGET:
FISCAL YEAR 1983, at 35 (June 1982).
131. Id.
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The Section has simply not carried out the bipartisan commit-
ment to vigorous enforcement of voting rights which has charac-
terized its own past activities.
III. THE SPECIAL LITIGATION SECTION-RIGHTS OF
INSTITUTIONALIZED AND HANDICAPPED PERSONS
A. Introduction
America's penal, mental health, and juvenile institutions are
rife with abuse of their populations.132 Recognizing the helpless-
ness of inmates to correct institutional misconduct on their own,
all the administrations during the past decade have encouraged
the Civil Rights Division to address the most flagrant infringe-
ments of their Constitutional rights. Congressional hearings
from 1978-80 documented continuing pervasive violations, an
American horror story that resulted in the passage of the Civil
Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act in 1980.133
It would be whimsical to believe that in the short time since
the Act's passage the problems it addressed have dissipated. In-
deed, several months after its enactment, the Comptroller Gen-
eral of the United States issued a report finding that "unsafe,
unsanitary conditions in many state prisons and local jails en-
danger the health and well-being of inmates, correctional staff,
and visitors"'84 and that "the Department of Justice could offer
132. See, e.g., Friedman, Rights of the Mentally Handicapped: Which Way in the
1980's?, 17 TRIAL 42, 46 (Feb. 1981); U.S. COMPTROLLER GENERAL, REPORT TO THE CON-
GRESS: WOMEN IN PRISON: INEQUITABLE TREATMENT REQUIRES ACTION (GAO Dec. 10,
1980); U.S. COMPTROLLER GENERAL, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: JAIL INMATES' MENTAL
HEALTH CARE NEGLECTED: STATE AND FEDERAL ATTENTION NEEDED (GAO Nov. 17, 1980);
U.S. COMPTROLLER GENERAL, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
CAN Do MORE TO IMPROVE CONDITIONS AT STATE AND LOCAL CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES
(GAO Sept. 15, 1980); Press, The Scandalous U.S. Jails, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 18, 1980, at
74-77a.
133. See, e.g., Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons, Hearings on H.R. 10 before
Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (February 14, 1979); Civil Rights of Insti-
tutionalized Persons, Hearings on S. 1393 before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (June 17-22, 1977); Civil
Rights of Institutionalized Persons, Hearing on H.R. 2439 and H.R. the Administration
of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (April 29, 1977).
134. U.S. COMPTROLLER GENERAL, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: THE DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE CAN Do MORE TO HELP IMPROVE CONDITIONS AT STATE AND LOCAL CORRECTIONAL
FACILITIES i (GAO Sept. 15, 1980).
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more assistance.' ' 135 Nevertheless, some eighteen months later,
in a speech before the National Conference of Governors, Assis-
tant Attorney General William Bradford Reynolds stated:
"Rarely does one find today the kind of blatant, inhumane bru-
talization of inmates that stands out like a constitutional red
flag to even the most casual observer."136
Within weeks of Mr. Reynolds' speech, a federal district
court in Indiana issued a preliminary order restraining state
prison officials from continuing .a practice of shackling celled in-
mates nude to their beds. 137 Simultaneously, defendants in
Texas' 38 and Alabama'3 9 were actively seeking to undo court or-
ders issued for non-compliance with constitutional standards
previously imposed.
Mr. Reynolds has criticized the courts in institutional cases
as "overly intrusive in ordering relief, mandating detailed re-
quirements to be followed by the states.""" Two weeks before
the State of Texas renewed its efforts to scale down reforms or-
dered in the most significant prison litigation in which the De-
partment is now involved,' Mr. Reynolds announced a policy
of leaving "many of the details to the states.'"
4
1
As is also true in the school segregation and employment
discrimination areas, Mr. Reynolds has minimized the scope of
the problems in modern institutions. By so doing, it becomes
simple to justify reduced levels of activity and attention. Mr.
Reynolds' public statements, and the informal policies and bu-
reaucratic controls he has instituted, have chilled the aggressive-
ness of the Special Litigation Section's staff.
135. Id. at ii-iii. See U.S. COMPTROLLER GENERAL, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: WOMEN
IN PRISON: INEQUITABLE TREATMENT REQUIRES ACTION (GAO Dec. 10, 1980); U.S. CoMp-
TROLLER GENERAL, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: JAIL INMATES' MENTAL HEALTH CARE NE-
GLECTED; STATE AND FEDERAL ATTENTION NEEDED (GAO Sept. 15, 1980).
136. W. Reynolds, Remarks Before National Governors Conference 1 (Feb. 21, 1982).
137. French v. Owens, 538 F. Supp. 910 (S.D. Ind. 1982) (order granting preliminary
injunction).
138. See Balz, Texas Battle Rages Outside Prisons, Washington Post, March 6, 1982,
at A4, col. 1 (regarding Ruiz v. Estelle, 553 F. Supp. 567 (S.D. Tex. 1982)).
139. Newman v. Alabama, 683 F.2d 1312 (11th Cir. 1982).
140. See LAUGHLIN, supra note 106, at 4-5.
141. See Texas Battle, supra note 108, at A4, col. 1.
142. W. Reynolds, Remarks Before the National Governors Conference 6 (Feb. 21,
1982).
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B. The Statutory Authority of the Special Litigation Section
The Special Litigation Section's authority derives from a
hodgepodge of federal statutes. The Section has broad jurisdic-
tion to enforce Titles II and III of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
which prohibit discrimination in public facilities and accommo-
dations, section 504 of the Federal Rehabilitation Act of 1973,143
the recent Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act,144 and
Titles II through VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 (the Indian
Civil Rights Act), 45 the Education of the Handicapped Act'"a
and the Revenue Sharing Act, 4 7 where those statutes protect
the rights of institutionalized persons. The bulk of the Section's
resources have been devoted to rooting out widespread viola-
tions of the rights of persons institutionalized in state and local
penal, mental health, and juvenile facilities.
The evolution of the Special Litigation Section reflects an
increasing expansion of civil rights enforcement authority. This
arm of the Civil Rights Division, once confined to routine cases
of segregation in public places, is now the country's most signifi-
cant protector of the rights of the nation's more than one million
institutionalized persons. Its history of steady, forward-looking
strides in civil rights enforcement and policy under both Repub-
lican and Democratic administrations is a model against which
the actions of any new administration must be compared.
In 1978 two actions filed by the Special Litigation Section
were dismissed on grounds that the United States had no statu-
tory basis to sue.148 These decisions effectively limited the Sec-
tion's new activities to participation in cases independently initi-
ated by private parties. Former Assistant Attorney General for
Civil Rights, Drew S. Days, III, pressed for passage of the Insti-
tutionalized Persons Act, which authorized the Division to bring
143. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). In the past the Section has also enforced
federal regulations pertaining to discrimination on the basis of handicap. Since January
1981, the Section has filed only one compliance action, probably because other responsi-
ble agencies have failed to refer complaints to it.
144. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1997-1997j (Supp. V 1981).
145. - 25 U.S.C. § 1301 (1976).
146. 20 U.S.C. § 1401 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
147. 31 U.S.C. § 1242 (1976).
148. United States v. Mattson, No. 74-138 (D. Mont. Sept. 28, 1976), a/f'd, 600 F.2d
1295 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v. Solomon, 419 F. Supp. 358 (D. Md. 1976), aff'd,
563 F.2d 1121 (4th Cir. 1977).
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litigation in its own right. The legislation took several years to
pass, and the Section's ability to generate new activities re-
mained limited. Finally, in May, 1980, the Civil Rights of Insti-
tutionalized Persons Act was passed, giving the Justice Depart-
ment specific authority to take action in this area. In the waning
days of the Carter Administration, the Section promptly began
implementing its procedures by issuing three notices of intent to
investigate conditions of confinement in correctional institu-
tions, " " and another regarding the adequacy of treatment pro-
vided in juvenile facilities in the Commonwealth of Puerto
Rico. 150 It was against this background that the policies of the
Reagan Administration took effect.
C. The Special Litigation Section Under the Reagan
Administration
Despite Mr. Reynolds' expressed desire to scale down insti-
tutional litigation, he continues to protest publicly that "the
commitment of this Administration to strong and vigorous en-
forcement of the many federal statutes," including the Institu-
tionalized Persons Act, "is not . . . empty rhetoric.''5 However,
the Reagan Administration's actions to enforce the Act thus far
do not support Mr. Reynolds' statement.
The Special Litigation Section does continue to pursue most
cases filed during previous Administrations. At the same time,
however, the Section has not aggressively pursued new cases;
tactics in pending cases have been amended and some legal posi-
tions altered; the Section's clear emphasis has been on concilia-
tion with state defendants; and, in at least two instances, the
Department has laid the groundwork to oppose relief that it has
supported in the past.
1. Freezing Civil Rights Enforcement
Mr. Reynolds has proudly reported that his Administration
has "initiated sixteen investigations of allegedly egregious condi-
tions" in correctional, nursing home, and mental health facili-
149. 1980 ATT'Y GEN. ANN. REP. 131.
150. Santana v. Collazo, Nos. 75-1187, 75-1213, 75-1466 (D.P.R. 1981).
151. W. Reynolds, Remarks Before the Delaware Bar Association 8 (Feb. 22, 1982).
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ties.'52 More relevant, however, is the fact that the Justice De-
partment's March 10, 1982, motion to intervene in a sex-
discrimination case against a Kentucky prison was the very first
new enforcement action filed by the Section in fifteen months
under the Reagan Administration. 5
The Section later intervened in a private suit, Davis v. Hen-
derson, involving a Louisiana hospital for mentally ill offenders.
The local U.S. Attorney, Stanley Bardwell, reportedly opposed
the intervention, allegedly "lost" the signed copy of the legal pa-
pers he had been instructed to file, and then refused to sign the
replacement copies. To Mr. Reynolds' credit, the suit was filed
despite his opposition.
However, Mr. Reynolds and Attorney General Smith have
rejected numerous other staff recommendations to initiate inves-
tigations, file suit or intervene. According to present and former
Section staffers, Mr. Reynolds rejected staff recommendations to
participate in litigation involving North Carolina facilities. In
another case regarding a Virginia mental hospital, he declined to
intervene on the basis that the state was conducting its own in-
vestigation. He refused to sue the Yuma, Arizona County Jail on
the grounds that its conditions were "too bad."
Additionally, Mr. Reynolds' figures appear misleading.
When questioned, attorneys within the Section could not sub-
stantiate the claim that sixteen investigations had been
launched. They surmised that the statistic includes all investiga-
tions initiated since the enactment of the new statute in eary
1980, which encompasses several begun prior to Mr. Reynold's
arrival.
Early in his term, Mr. Reynolds circulated a memorandum
to the staff that all decisions reflecting litigation tactics or pol-
icy, however small, must be approved by the Section's supervi-
sory staff. Although this directive was purported to enable Mr.
Reynolds to "familiarize himself" with the operation of the Sec-
152. Id.
153. Canterino v. George Wilson, C.A. No. C80-0545-L(J) (W.D. Ky.). Since March
10, 1982, one additional complaint has been filed, USA v. Baylor University Medical
Center, C.A. No. 3-82-0453D. However, it is an extremely limited action against Baylor
University to enforce regulations of the Department of Health and Human Services, and
involves no substantial issues.
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tion as he commenced his new duties," 4 the directive continues
in effect today. As a result, Mr. Reynolds and his immediate
subordinates review most pleadings, spending much of their
working days editing and directing technical staff decisions. On
May 27, 1981, Attorney General Smith further tightened con-
trols over the independence of line attorneys to litigate prison
cases by ordering that: "[tihe Civil Rights Division is directed to
obtain the recommendation of the Bureau of Prisons in connec-
tion with all important pleadings in sufficient time to ensure
their meaningful participation . . . This directive . . . applies to
all pending cases as well as those not yet filed." '155
Encouraged by the obvious rift between the administra-
tion's policy-makers and the line staff, state defendants accused
of constitutional abuses appear to feel free to seek protection
from highly placed administration officials. In one such suit Mr.
Reynolds personally negotiated directly with the state, bypas-
sing the Section's staff attorneys who had worked on the case for
several years." In another well-publicized case involving the
Mississippi prisons, the Special Litigation Section sought an or-
der permitting federal agents to inspect county jails to ensure
compliance with standards set by the court. Unbeknownst to the
attorneys litigating the case, Deputy Attorney General Schmults,
in private discussions with Mississippi Congressman Trent Lott,
agreed to rely on an inspection by the State's own officials."5 7
When the staff attorneys continued to investigate the state's
compliance with the court order, Lott sought, though unsuccess-
fully, to have them discharged: "I want to know . . . why [a
named staff attorney] has not been fired. There are too many
lawyers ready and eager to carry out Ronald Reagan's policies to
permit those policies to be subverted by mere civil servants."1 6
154. Memorandum from William B. Reynolds to All Employees (Aug. 19, 1981).
155. Memorandum from William F. Smith to Giuliani, Jenson, Carson, and Turner
(Mar. 27, 1981).
156. See text accompanying notes 160-62.
157. The Clarion Ledger, July 22, 1981, at 18A, col. 2-3.
158. Letter from Congressman T. Lott to Deputy Att'y Gen. Schmults (Oct. 21,
1981), quoted in LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 69, at 73-74.
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2. Deference to Defendants' Remedial Plans
A more tangible policy shift has been Mr. Reynolds' ex-
pressed, unambiguous desire to settle cases to the satisfaction of
state defendants.15 9 In Ruiz v. Estelle,' ° the largest prison case
in which the Section is currently involved, Mr. Reynolds ex-
cluded Section attorneys and personally negotiated with state
officials to reduce the relief ordered by the district court up to
the moment that he himself argued the appeal before the Fifth
Circuit."' Mr. Reynolds has continued his attempts to settle
Ruiz, excluding from the negotiations not only counsel for the
plaintiffs on whose behalf the government originally intervened,
but also the Section attorneys who have handled the case for the
last four years. The net result was that the Division urged rever-
sal, in part, of an order it had advocated in the lower court.
62
The Section has not been permitted to take positions on
critical disputed issues in its cases. In one set of consolidated
cases involving overcrowding in the Alabama prisons,"" the dis-
trict court several times found the state in non-compliance with
its order. 64 Frustrated by the state's recalcitrance, the court or-
dered 352 prisoners released (later reduced to 290), and the state
appealed. A staff attorney in the Special Litigation Section
drafted an appellate brief supporting the district court's decree,
but Mr. Reynolds ordered that the government take no position
on appeal.
Perhaps the most blatant refusal to act involved allegations
of racial segregation in a North Carolina prison. Section attor-
neys had negotiated with the prison officials to remedy the prob-
lem. When they recommended to Mr. Reynolds that a suit be
initiated, his response was to meet personally with a lawyer for
the state and allow an additional six months for it to remedy the
violation. When that grace period ended, he chastised Section
159. W. Reynolds, Remarks Before the National Governors Conference (Feb. 21,
1982).
160. 679 F.2d 1115 (5th Cir. 1983).
161. Id. at 1125.
162. Id., Brief of the United States, at 93, 127.
163. Newman v. Alabama, C.A. Nos. 3501-N, 74-57-N, 74-203-N (M.D. Ala.).
164. Id. See history recited in Newman v. Alabama, 466 F. Supp. 628 (M.D. Ala.
1979) and Newman v. Alabama, C.A. Nos. 3501-N, 74-57-N, 74-203-N (M.D. Ala.) (order
of October 9, 1980 finding further non-compliance). See also Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp.
318 (M.D. Ala. 1976), affd, 559 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1979).
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attorneys who reminded him that the deadline had passed. More
than a year after suit was recommended, North Carolina has not
corrected the problem and Mr. Reynolds has not approved any
enforcement action.
3. Non-Litigation Policy Shifts
The Administration's intent to limit the Special Litigation
Section's ability to oversee state compliance with acceptable
prison standards is evident in non-litigative contexts as well. At
the end of the Carter Administration, the Department issued
and published comprehensive regulations that were required by
the Institutionalized Persons Act,16 setting forth minimum
standards for inmate grievance procedures in state institutions
and establishing a method for federal certification of the proce-
dures.1 66 Within two months of the rules' issuance, Attorney
General Smith deferred their implementation.6 7 Four months
after that, the old rules were amended, without opportunity for
public comment. 6 8 The new scheme limited inmate participa-
tion in grievances' 69 (perhaps to a level below federal statutory
requirements),' 0 eliminated provisions for outside review of
grievances concerning correctional policy,1 7 ' and removed re-
quirements assuring the grievance procedures be fully explained
to inmates and that inmates incapable of filing grievances re-
ceive necessary assistance and training.'17 Despite these substan-
tial changes, the committee that had worked on the initial regu-
lation was not consulted before-or after-the final issuance of
the amendments.
Similarly, on July 23, 1981, Attorney General Smith unilat-
erally withdrew the preamble to Federal Standards For Prisons
and Jails, which the previous Administration had issued.' 73 His
165. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(b)(1) (1980).
166. Standards for Inmate Grievance Procedures, 28 C.F.R. § 40 (1982).
167. 46 Fed. Reg. 16,100 (1981).
168. 46 Fed. Reg. 36843, 36865-69 (1981).
169. Compare 46 Fed. Reg. 36866-68 (1981) with 46 Fed. Reg. 3845-47 (1981).
170. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(b)(2)(A). See also Letter of Edward I. Koren (ACLU Na-
tional Prison Project) to Michael Pearlman (Federal Bureau of Prisons) (August 17,
1981).
171. Compare 46 Fed. Reg. 36867 (1981) with 46 Fed. Reg. 3846 (1981).
172. Compare 46 Fed. Reg. 36866-67 (1981) with 46 Fed. Reg. 3846 (1981).
173. U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL STANDARDS FOR PRISONS AND JAILS (GPO De-
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cursory statement emphasized that "[p]enal institutions are free
to utilize these guidelines or not as they see fit" and that
"[t]hese standards create no legally enforceable rights or expec-
tations of any kind. '174 He also noted, in the face of the newly
enacted Institutionalized Persons Act, which explicitly imposed
federal constitutional standards upon state institutions, that "in
the event of violations of law, remedies must be imposed that
afford maximum discretion to a penal institution to bring its
conditions up to an acceptable environment.
4. Policy Changes in Pending Litigation
Seeds of retrenchment of the Special Litigation Section's at-
titudes have begun to sprout throughout its litigation. In the ap-
peal from the district court decision in Pennhurst State School
& Hospital v. Halderman, for example, Mr. Reynolds indicated
that he intended to take a substantive position on the scope of
the law that prohibits discrimination on the basis of handicap
that would directly contradict the Special Litigation Section's
previous stance, '7  and that would substantially limit the scope
of future cases involving the Act.
17 7
The most significant and distressing policy stance has come
in reaction to the Supreme Court's decision in Youngberg v. Ro-
meo.' 79 In Romeo, private plaintiffs urged the Supreme Court to
declare a constitutional right to treatment for persons in state
cember 16, 1980).
174. U.S. Dept. of Justice, Change in Preamble of Federal Standards for Prisons and
Jails, December 16, 1980 (July 23, 1981).
175. Id.
176. See, e.g., Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hospital, 446 F. Supp. 1295
(E.D. Pa. 1978); Post-Trial Memorandum of the United States, App. No. 78-1490 (3d
Cir.); Brief for the United States (filed October 14, 1981) at 40-41, 61. The appeal from
the district court's decision is part of a long history of litigation in this case. Halderman
v. Pennhurst State School & Hospital, 446 F. Supp. 1295 (E.D. Pa. 1977), aff'd in part
and rev'd in part, 612 F.2d 84 (3d Cir. 1979), rev'd sub. nom, Pennhurst State School &
Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981), on remand sub. nom, Halderman v. Pennhurst
State School & Hospital, 673 F.2d 647 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. granted sub. nom, Pennhurst
State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 457 U.S. 1131 (1982).
177. See Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 612 F.2d 84 (3d Cir.
1979) (en banc), rev'd sub. nom, Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 451
U.S. 1 (1981), on remand sub. nom, Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hospital,
673 F.2d 647 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. granted sub. nom, Pennhurst State School & Hospital
v. Halderman, 457 U.S. 1131 (1982).
178. 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
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mental retardation institutions. The divided Court issued a nar-
row opinion, upholding such a right insofar as necessary to "en-
sure [residents'] safety and to facilitate [their] ability to func-
tion free from bodily restraints.' 1 9 The Court noted, however,
that "[i]n view of the kinds of treatment sought by respondent
and the evidence of record, we need go no further in this
case." 180 It thus expressly declined to reach the argument, made
by the Justice Department in other cases, that inmates have a
constitutional right to treatment, including the right to commu-
nity placement where appropriate, psychiatric services, and spe-
cial education. "
Shortly after Romeo was issued, Mr. Reynolds presented
each of the Special Litigation Section's staff attorneys with a
copy of a handwritten memorandum instructing them that, in
his view, Romeo had ruled against a right to treatment beyond
that necessary to assure an inmate's safety in his institution. He
thus declared that henceforth the Section would no longer be
permitted to rely on the due process theory to promote inmates'
rights. This unduly restrictive reading of Romeo, if adhered to,
would severely undercut the Section's position in most of the
mental health litigation in which it is involved. Section attorneys
have submitted a ten-page rebuttal of Mr. Reynolds' views, ask-
ing him to reconsider. On August 25, 1982, he decided not to
change his position.
D. The Special Litigation Section-Which Way The Future?
It remains too early to evaluate the full course this Adminis-
tration's institutional litigation will take. While the philosophy
expressed by Mr. Reynolds lends credence to the expectation
that significant retrenchment will occur in the area of civil rights
for handicapped and institutionalized persons, the Administra-
tion has not yet been fully tested; the signs of change, discussed
179. Id. at 324.
180. Id. at 319.
181. The Supreme Court expressly left this issue open:
If, as seems the case, respondent seeks only training related to safety and free-
dom from restraints, this case does not present the difficult question whether a
mentally retarded person, involuntarily committed to a state institution, has
some general constitutional right to training per se. . ..
Id. at 318.
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above, have still been relatively few.
Since the issuance of a critical report by the Leadership
Conference on Civil Rights,182 feverish activity has been evident
within the Section to bolster its claims of commitment to insti-
tutional litigation. A few new investigations have been com-
menced, and observers postulate that some new lawsuits may
even be filed. Over the long haul, however, the crucial issue will
not be the number of cases the Section institutes, but the legal
positions it is ordered to take. It remains to be seen whether
protestations of "commitment" to the Section's goals are, in
fact, empty rhetoric or reality.
IV. FEDERAL ENFORCEMENT SECTION-DISCRIMINATION IN
EMPLOYMENT
A. Background and History of the Federal Enforcement
Section
The present Federal Enforcement Section of the Civil
Rights Division was formed in 1979. It is the successor to the
Division's Employment Seciton, which since 1969 had responsi-
bility for the Division's equal employment opportunity
activities.18
The primary legal prohibition against employment discrimi-
nation is Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. 8" Until 1972,
the Employment Section was the only federal office empowered
to bring suit to enforce Title VII, because the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") could seek only to
conciliate complaints. 85 The 1972 amendments to Title VII,
however, transferred to the EEOC concurrent authority to bring
suit against private employers. Since 1974, when the EEOC's au-
thority to sue became exclusive, the Division's jurisdiction has
been limited primarily to systematic patterns and practices of
employment discrimination by state and local governments, re-
cipients of federal financial assistance, and federal government
182. LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 69, at 73-74.
183. UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS EN-
FORCEMENT EFFORT 118 (1971); 1979 Arr'Y GEN. ANN. REP. 111.
184. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
185. UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, To ELIMINATE EMPLOYMENT DIS-
CRIMINATION: A SEQUEL 245-47 (1977) [hereinafter cited as 1977 CRC REPORT].
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contractors.'"6 These functions were performed in 1974-79 by
the Employment Section and the litigation component of the
Federal Programs Section. In 1979, these offices were merged
into the newly created Federal Enforcement Section.
Over the years, the Division has built an admirable reputa-
tion as an opponent of employment discrimination. Equally im-
portant, the Division has helped to shape appropriate remedies
for violations of the employment discrimination laws. As the Di-
vision itself noted, its arguments in United States v. Local 53,
Asbestos Workers"7 "first established the principle that affirma-
tive steps must be taken to correct the effects [of] past discrimi-
natory employment practices."' 88 The Division has similarly
stated that "the landmark decisions sustaining the use of nu-
merical goals and timetables as a remedy for past discrimination
were either in cases brought by the Civil Rights Division . . . or
in which the Division participated as amicus.' 9 Cases involving
such remedies as backpay and retroactive seniority have also
been litigated successfully by the Division,'9 0 during both Re-
publican and Democratic Administrations.
B. The Federal Enforcement Section Under the Reagan
Administration
The Civil Rights Division under the Reagan administration
has completely reversed its previous position concerning the ap-
propriate relief in Title VII cases. Although the Division itself
helped to establish the principle that affirmative actions, such as
numerical goals and timetables, may be necessary in some cases
to remedy employment discrimination, the Division has now
stated that it will not advocate such remedies in any cases, even
where an employer has engaged in a pattern or practice of dis-
crimination.' 9' Assistant Attorney General Reynolds has an-
186. Id. at 247-52.
187. 407 F.2d 1047 (5th Cir. 1969).
188. 1977 CRC REPORT, supra note 185, at 277 n.76 (quoting a memorandum of the
Chief of the Employment Section).
189. Id. See, e.g., United States v. Local 86, Ironmakers, 443 F.2d 544 (9th Cir. 1971).
190. See 1977 CRC REPORT, supra note 185, at 277 n.76.
191. Employment Opportunity on Affirmative Action, 1981: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Employment Opportunities of the House Comm. on Education and La-
bor, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 132, 139-41, 153-55 (1981) (statement of William Bradford
Reynolds) [hereinafter cited as 1981 House Testimony]; W. Reynolds, Remarks Before
[Vol. 1
REAGAN CIVIL RIGHTS RECORD
nounced that he will seek a test case to overturn the Supreme
Court's decision upholding affirmative action plans in United
States Steelworkers v. Weber.
192
1. Rejection of Affirmative Action in All Circumstances
Mr. Reynolds has stated that affirmative action remedies
will be replaced by injunctions that prohibit discrimination, by
increased emphasis on the recruitment of women and minorities,
and by backpay and seniority awards to identified victims of dis-
crimination. According to the Assistant Attorney General, Title
VII should provide remedies only for those individuals who can
be identified as victims of discrimination, and not for other
members of their class. The ideological basis for the rejection of
affirmative action in Title VII cases is the concept, often invoked
by Attorney General Smith and Mr. Reynolds, that the Consti-
tution is "color blind" and countenances no discrimination, not
even to remedy past discriminatory practices.
This view is, of course, contrary to the Supreme Court's de-
cision in the Weber case, and is tantamount to an announcement
that the Civil Rights Division will not enforce the law of the
land. In effect, Mr. Reynolds was virtually required to declare
his intentions to seek reversal of Weber. Significantly, Mr. Reyn-
olds claims no novel legal theory or newly discovered legislative
history on which to argue his test case. Rather, it is based on his
philosophical disagreement with the Court's decision. The Ad-
ministration can accommodate this view because, as Mr. Reyn-
olds has stated, it believes that "racial and other stereotyping is
declining and most people now accept the legal and moral im-
perative to treat people equally . . .9 In other words, as with
school desegregation, the Administration has simply decided
that employment discrimination is no longer a serious problem.
This virtual repudiation of bipartisan federal law is a dra-
35th National Conference on Labor 2, 3 (June 11, 1982).
192. W. Reynolds, Remarks Before Tenth Annual Conference of Executive Enter-
prises, Inc. 4 (Jan. 22, 1982) [hereinafter cited as Tenth Annual Conference]; Civil
Rights Division Head Will Seek Supreme Court Ban on Affirmative Action, Wall Street
Journal, Dec. 8, 1981, at 4, col. 2; see United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 1971
(1979).
193. W. Reynolds, Remarks Before the Conference on Equal Employment Opportu-
nity in the Public Sector 3 (Feb. 1, 1982).
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matic shift. For over twenty years, affirmative action has been a
part of the federal government's strategy for combating discrim-
ination. Since President Kennedy signed Executive Order 19025,
the laws of Congress and the orders of the Executive have con-
tinued to encourage employers to take deliberate affirmative
steps to bring about equal employment opportunity. 9 4 Indeed,
in enacting Title VII, Congress gave the courts express authori-
zation to use "affirmative action .. .or any other equitable re-
lief as the court deems appropriate. ' 195 As the U.S. Commission
on Civil Rights emphasized last year, affirmative action remains
necessary to achieve meaningful success in combating the con-
tinuing problem of employment discrimination, Mr. Reynolds'
personal views notwithstanding."'9
Instead of requesting affirmative hiring and promotion re-
lief, the Division has announced that it will now seek to
rely-almost exclusively-on recruitment programs to combat
discrimination, 97 as exemplified by the consent decree in
United States v. Vermont.9 ' So long as an employer's pool of
applicants includes women and minorities, according to this pol-
icy, sufficient affirmative remedial action has been taken without
regard to the number that are actually hired.
Such an exclusive focus on recruitment practices is ineffec-
tive, impractical, and contrary to established case law. It is inef-
fective because it ignores discrimination in promotions, where
the "applicant" pool is predetermined by the pre-existing work
force, and because it allows an employer to continue to discrimi-
nate in actual hiring decisions so long as the pool of applications
194. See 26 Fed Reg. 1977, 1959-63 Comp. 448; 30 Fed. Reg. 12319 (Sept. 24, 1965),
as amended by Exec. Order No. 11375, 32 Fed. Reg. 1430 (Oct. 13, 1967), 3 C.F.R. 406;
42 U.S.C. § 2000e note (1970), as amended by Equal Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L.
No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103. See also Contractors Ass'n of Eastern Pennsylvania v. Secretary
of Labor, 442 F.2d 159, 168-71 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 854 (1971).
195. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g). See Contractors Ass'n of Eastern Pennsylvania v. Secre-
tary of Labor, 442 F.2d 159, 173 n.47 (3d Cir. 1971).
196. U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN THE 1980's: DIsMAN-
TLING THE PROCESS OF DISCRIMINATION 1-7 (1981).
197. See Tenth Annual Conference, supra note 192, at 12; 1981 House Testimony,
supra note 191, at 11; W. Reynolds, Remarks Before the Delaware Bar Association (Feb.
22, 1982).
198. No. 81-380 (D. Vt. 1981). Similar settlements have been or will be entered into
in cases against state police forces in New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Massachusetts,
Connecticut and Virginia.
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from women and minorities is sufficient, even if none are hired.
It is impractical because effective monitoring of compliance
would require the Division to review detailed information on re-
cruitment activities at a time when the Division's staff, and its
inclination to monitor, is being reduced.' And it is contrary to
established case law because it ignores the frequent holdings of
the federal courts that affirmative remedies are permissible and
indeed required in certain cases.2 00 As Justice Blackmun ex-
plained in the Bakke case, there is often "no other way" to "get
beyond racism" than to "take account of race" in seeking to
remedy entrenched patterns of discrimination.2 '
In many employment discrimination cases, of course, affirm-
ative hiring remedies are neither necessary nor appropriate. But
for the Division to abandon them entirely, and not evaluate each
situation on its individual merits, weakens its ability to negoti-
ate, discourages voluntary affirmative action efforts and fore-
closes the possibility of meaningful relief in some cases. This re-
treat is further evidence to women and minorities that the Civil
Rights Division is no longer their ally.
2. Discriminatory Job-Testing
The Division's retreat from the requirements of applicable
case law and its own historical positions in employment discrim-
ination litigation has not been limited to the area of affirmative
action. In Connecticut v. Teal,202 the Department of Justice
joined the defendant, the State of Connecticut, in contending
that a plaintiff should not be able to make out a prima facie
case of employment discrimination by proving that a job test
used by an employer operates to discriminate against minorities
where, independent of the use of the allegedly discriminatory
test, the employer has hired significant numbers of other minor-
ity employees .203 This position was taken although the Division
itself, under both Republican and Democratic administrations,
has supported and helped establish the well-recognized principle
199. See UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS
ENFORCEMENT BUDGET: FISCAL YEAR 1983 29-31 (June 1982).
200. See id. at 5-6.
201. University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 307 (1978).
202. 457 U.S. 440 (1982).
203. See id. at 442.
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that the use of tests which discriminate against minorities con-
stitutes a violation of Title VII.
Interestingly, the Department's argument in Teal contra-
dicts not only its past positions, but also the position it has most
recently taken concerning affirmative action. In the affirmative
action area, as discussed above, the Division has argued that Ti-
tle VII should be interpreted to provide remedies only for indi-
vidual victims of employment discrimination, and that remedies
directed at increasing the number of minority employees in an
employer's work force are not justified. In Teal, however, as the
Supreme Court specifically noted, the State of Connecticut and
the Justice Department took the position that Title VII effec-
tively granted an employer a "license to discriminate" against an
"individual employee" on the grounds of race or sex "merely be-
cause [the employer] favorably treats other members of the em-
ployees' group." 04 The only consistent principle which explains
the Division's conflicting stance in these two areas is a simple
one-when in doubt, favor the employer.
The Supreme Court's opinion in Teal draws attention to an-
other interesting aspect of the Department's change in position,
as reflected in its participation in that case. The Court specifi-
cally noted that the Government's brief in Teal was submitted
by the Department of Justice, which "shares responsibility for
federal enforcement of Title VII" with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission. But the EEOC, the Court observed,
"declined to join" the Department's brief.
2 05
The Supreme Court rejected the position advocated by the
Department in Teal. The Court held that in accordance with the
long-standing decision in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 20 6 a test
which operates to discriminate against minorities and which
cannot be shown to be "job-related," violates Title VII, regard-
less of whether the employer has "favorably treated" other
members of the minority group.207 The Justice Department's ar-
guments to the contrary, the Court noted, would have created a
"special haven for discriminatory test," in violation of Title
204. d. at 455.
205. Id. at 451 n.11.
206. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
207. Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 454 (1982).
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VII.20 8 The unequivocal rejection by the Supreme Court of the
Division's position in Teal provides further evidence that the
Division has abandoned vigorous enforcement of Title VII.
V. COORDINATION AND REVIEW SECTION-DISCRIMINATION IN
FEDERALLY FUNDED PROGRAMS
A. Introduction
The most important non-litigation function of the Civil
Rights Division is performed by the Coordination and Review
Section. This Section was created during the Carter Administra-
tion, as the Sex Discrimination Task Force, to review federal
statutes and regulations for sex bias. After an internal reorgani-
zation, the Task Force became the Office of Coordination and
Review, which was assigned responsibility for government-wide
coordination of Title VII enforcement by the Attorney General.
The Office was elevated to the status of a Section in 1980 and
now, under Executive Order 12250 (Nov. 2, 1980), it is responsi-
ble for the government-wide coordination of all federal govern-
ment activities to prevent discrimination in federal programs or
programs benefiting from federal assistance on the basis of race,
national origin, sex, or handicap. 09 The Section is not responsi-
ble for age or political discrimination, nor does it engage in
litigation.
The Section is intended to be the federal government's pri-
mary civil rights coordinator-the manifestation of the Divi-
sion's symbolic role of advocate for minorities and handicapped
persons with federal agencies. Significantly, the Section's activi-
ties for the first twenty months of the Reagan Administration
indicate a virtual abdication of this role.
B. Failure to Publish Minimum Guidelines
The 1980 Executive Order 12250 intended to eliminate in-
consistent federal civil rights rules by requiring the Civil Rights
Division to promulgate minimum standards for all agencies to
adopt. This, it was believed, would promote fair and uniform
regulations and relieve some of the complex burdens federal
208. Id. at 452.
209. See 45 Fed. Reg. 72995 (1980).
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agencies faced in attempting to comply with the sophisticated
civil rights laws. President Reagan has not rescinded or modified
that Order, and it remains in full force.
Nevertheless, in its first twenty months the Section has
failed even to publish proposed minimum guidelines. Federal
agencies continue to submit for prior review their own internally
developed regulations, and the Section's personnel continue to
sift through them on a case-by-case basis. This omission has
been caused, in some measure, by an insufficient allocation of
resources to the Section.2 10 This staff shortage, according to the
U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, also impedes the Section's
ability to review thoroughly the proposed regulations it does re-
ceive, and prevents meaningful monitoring and evaluation activ-
ities to determine if agencies are actually following their own
rules.2
C. Draft Regulations for Enforcement of Discrimination
Laws
The Section's primary regulatory activity during its first
twenty months, aside from reviewing individual agency propos-
als, has been to draft about one-half of the required minimum
standards, although none have even been proposed for adoption.
One portion of these drafts involves the procedural mechanisms
that agencies must follow in promulgating and determining vio-
lations of their rules.
1. Monitoring Compliance
At the insistence of the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB), the initial draft of the coordinating regulations for the
procedures that federal agencies must follow in monitoring their
grants was intended to reduce the regulatory burden upon the
recipients of federal financial assistance. The Division sought to
accomplish this goal in three important ways.
First, the new draft regulations simply redefine, in a more
narrow fashion, the term "recipient." Second, the draft regula-
tions would limit the ability of federal agencies to require recipi-
210. UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS EN-
FORCEMENT BUDGET: FISCAL YEAR 1983, 31, 38-39 (1982).
211. Id. at 39.
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ents to provide them with detailed information concerning civil
rights compliance. Third, the draft regulations limit the agen-
cies' ability to conduct compliance reviews.
The thrust of these changes is clear. Under the guise of re-
moving "undue" regulatory burdens, the Administration is re-
laxing enforcement of the civil rights laws. In the overall scheme
of things, enforcement of those laws is simply not a priority
matter.
2. Rights of Handicapped Persons
The only substantive regulation currently in draft form con-
cerns the provisions for enforcing prohibitions against discrimi-
nation on the basis of handicap. According to some Section per-
sonnel, these regulations were selected first because the
Administration believed that handicapped persons were fewer or
less well-organized than women and racial minorities, thus mak-
ing easier the task of cutting back the level of civil rights protec-
tions currently available. Once these changes were adopted and
in place, they would provide a model and a precedent for similar
changes in sex and race regulations.
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 prohibits dis-
crimination on the basis of handicap by federal executive agen-
cies and by programs or activities that receive federal financial
assistance.112 This statute is the major piece of civil rights legis-
lation for disabled people, and demonstrated Congress' strong
commitment to ending discrimination based upon handicap.
The Department of Health, Education and Welfare was ini-
tially designated as the lead agency for coordination of consis-
tent, government-wide enforcement of section 504, under Execu-
tive Order 11914 (April 28, 1976).2 18 After extensive nationwide
pressure from disability groups, HEW published guidelines for
implementing section 504 on January 13, 1978.2"4 These guide-
lines set forth enforcement procedures, standards for determin-
ing which persons are handicapped, and general guidelines for
determining what practices are discriminatory. Each federal
agency that provides federal financial assistance is required to
212. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
213. 41 Fed. Reg. 17871 (1980).
214. 45 C.F.R. § 84.1-84.61 (1982).
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use the HEW guidelines as a model for.its own regulations im-
plementing section 504 and a number of federal agencies have
published proposed or final regulations intended to implement
section 504.
Responsibility for coordinating the implementation and en-
forcement of section 504 was, as noted above, transferred to the
Department of Justice in 1980 by Executive Order 12250. Under
this Order, the Department must assure that all federal agencies
which provide financial assistance have regulations and enforce-
ment procedures which are consistent with the Department's co-
ordination guidelines. The existing HEW guidelines will con-
tinue in force until they have been revoked or modified by the
Department.
Draft coordination guidelines, dated January 27, 1982, were
distributed for comment to federal agencies which provide feder-
al financial assistance, but no official rules have yet been
promulgated.
A version of the regulations prepared in January, 1982,
demonstrates that the Division is attempting to substantially
erode existing protections for the civil rights of disabled individ-
uals. Although there have been several revisions of various sec-
tions, this draft remains the most "official" version pending dis-
tribution of any modifications. Current 504 regulations protect
disabled people against discrimination in employment, educa-
tion, physical accessibility, and many programs and services.
The proposed Department draft weakens many of these protec-
tions, and will create uncertain and piecemeal enforcement in
others. In particular, the draft regulations would produce drastic
changes in four areas: general equal opportunity standards,
"program specific" coverage, elementary and secondary educa-
tion, and post-secondary education.
D. Suspension of Mass Transit Regulations
The bulk of the Coordination and Review Section's activi-
ties involve the review of regulations submitted by other federal
agencies for the purpose of determining their compliance with
the government-wide minimum standards. In the case of section
504 protections for handicapped persons, this means the old
HEW regulations would remain in effect until the Division actu-
ally promulgates new ones.
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Despite this obligation, the Section has, on several occa-
sions, approved agency regulations that more closely reflect the
draft proposals not yet adopted than the existing regulations. In
fact, the mass transportation regulations of the HEW guidelines
have been suspended for more than a year, so that minimum
standards no longer exist in that area.
1. The Department of Transportation Rules
On July 20, 1981, the Department of Transportation (DOT)
issued a final interim rule, without notice or public comment,
revoking requirements that federally assisted transportation sys-
tems make certain types of access available to handicapped pa-
trons. There was little doubt that the rule was in direct contra-
vention of the existing section 504 guidelines, but rather than
refusing to approve it the Justice Department summarily sus-
pended the applicable guidelines-three weeks after DOT had
already published its rule.215 The notice stated that the rule sus-
pension was necessary to "ensure that the DOT's rule is not in-
consistent with the coordination guidelines issued by the De-
partment of Justice ....
2. Civil Aeronautics Board Rules
In June, 1982, the CAB published its final rules with regard
to nondiscrimination on the basis of handicap, designed to as-
sure that handicapped individuals have access to air transporta-
tion services.2  A major concern of handicapped persons was the
limited accessibility of most aircraft, such as narrow aisles and
small seats, and they requested the CAB to require, consistent
with HEW guidelines, that airlines make limited structural mod-
ifications to accommodate them.
The CAB, however, relying on Justice's suspension of the
mass transportation regulations nearly a year earlier, noted that
it was "free to adopt" its own standards and rejected the need
for any modifications. 8 Presumably, Justice had, pursuant to
Executive Order 12250, reviewed and approved the regulations
215. 46 Fed. Reg. 40687 (1981).
216. Id.
217. 47 Fed. Reg. 25936 (1982).
218. Id. at 25940.
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prior to their publication.
It is of no little signficance that an entire portion of the ex-
tant regulations were simply suspended more than a year ago.
No interim rules have been promulgated, and the final rules, as
noted above, have not even been published in a proposed form
for public review and comment. Under Mr. Reynolds' direction,
the Division has simply ignored its responsibilities to coordinate
implementation of federal laws and regulations.
VI. THE CRIMINAL SECTION-CRIMINAL VIOLATION OF CIVIL
RIGHTS STATUTES
The Criminal Section of the Civil Rights Division has au-
thority to prosecute violations of a variety of federal civil rights
statutes that provide for criminal sanctions. By far the largest
number of cases involve misconduct by law enforcement officers
(e.g., police, correctional officers, and INS officers) and include
instances of brutality, harassment, witness intimidation, and
perjury, among others. These cases are brought primarily under
18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242.
Among the non-law enforcement prosecutions concluded by
the Section are cases dealing with racially motivated acts of vio-
lence, including Ku Klux Klan activity, brought primarily under
18 U.S.C. § 245(b)(2); racially motivated interference with hous-
ing rights, brought under 42 U.S.C. § 3631; and involuntary ser-
vitude, brought under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1581 and 1583. In addition,
the Justice Department has the authority to enforce a variety of
little-used criminal statutes, including 18 U.S.C. § 2191, which
prohibits cruelty to seamen and was invoked recently for the
first time in 80 years.
According to Assistant Attorney General Reynolds, the
number of criminal prosecutions brought by the Justice Depart-
ment under the civil rights acts is equal to or greater than the
number brought by the Department under the Carter and Ford
administrations during comparable periods of time. In his Feb-
ruary 22, 1982 address to the Delaware Bar Association, Mr.
Reynolds cited, as the first example of the civil rights enforce-
ment efforts of the Reagan Administration, the record of the
Criminal Section. He stated that between January 29, 1981, and
February 22, 1982, the Section had "filed 43 new cases charging
criminal violations of the civil rights laws and had conducted tri-
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als in 11 other cases that were previously under indictment." '21
According to Reynolds, "this level of activity exceeds the 'track
record' of prior administrations."2 0 Interviews with the Chief of
the Criminal Section and others confirm these figures.
Traditionally, the most controversial and unpopular Crimi-
nal Section prosecutions are those brought against law enforce-
ment officials. Yet these cases generally have been approved by
Assistant Attorney General Reynolds. For example, in the last
year the Section has brought cases against five INS officers at
Ft. Chaffee, Arkansas, who were charged with beating Cuban
refugees. It has prosecuted a member of the Border Patrol for
sexually molesting Mexican immigrants. It prosecuted the police
chief in Tyler, Texas, for "setting up" defendants on drug
charges and it has prosecuted a New Orleans homicide detective
for brutality after a defendant died during interrogation.
The Administration has not yet had to confront two issues
that could test its commitment to vigorous enforcement. The
first is the so-called "dual prosecution" situation, where law en-
forcement officers are accused of acts that may violate both fed-
eral civil rights laws and state criminal law. In previous adminis-
trations the policy was to grant priority to the state prosecution
unless there was some "compelling federal interest" in proceed-
ing in a particular case. If the state declined to prosecute or
prosecuted ineffectively, or if the officers were acquitted, the
Civil Rights Division was then authorized to proceed. In view of
the Administration's "states' rights" philosophy, however, it re-
mains to be seen whether such cases, particularly those with
high visibility, will continue to be prosecuted at the federal level.
The second issue, somewhat related to the "dual prosecu-
tion" problem, involves conflicts between Civil Rights Division
attorneys and local U.S. Attorneys. U.S. Attorneys are political
appointees, whose views are, presumably, consonant with the
Administration's. Their decisions about which civil rights cases
219. W. Reynolds, Remarks Before the Delaware Bar Association 6 (Feb. 22, 1982).
The significance of the January 29, 1981 date is somewhat obscure and was, perhaps, an
error since the Reagan Administration took office on January 20, 1982 rather than Janu-
ary 29. In fact, between January 29, 1981 and February 22, 1982 forty new cases were





to prosecute in their locales may well be at fundamental odds
with the views of the career lawyers in the Division. How those
differences are resolved will be a telling factor in the Adminis-
tration's ultimate record.
Despite speculation about what might happen in the future,
statistically it does appear that the Justice Department is doing
more civil rights enforcement in criminal cases than it did in the
past. Statistics can, of course, be misleading and this Adminis-
tration, not unlike others, may be manipulating numbers to
make them say what the Administration wishes them to say. At-
tempts have apparently been made to re-characterize cases
brought under the Carter Administration to make it appear that
relatively fewer civil rights prosecutions were initiated during
that time. On the other hand, many of the cases brought by U.S.
Attorneys' offices which the current Administration includes in
its total may include one or more counts under the civil rights
statutes that are not necessarily true "civil rights" cases. Prose-
cutions of witness intimidation, for example, may have more to
do with issues of criminal justice administration than with civil
rights. To some extent, therefore, official statistics may be unre-
liable and it may be futile to try to compare statistics from one
year to another. Nevertheless, there is general agreement among
those individuals we interviewed that the Justice Department
has initiated at least as many and perhaps more criminal rights
prosecutions under the Reagan Administration than under pre-
vious administrations, and that, to date, there has been no overt
attempt to interfere inappropriately with the work of the Crimi-
nal Section.
There are several explanations for this result. Preliminarily,
it must be remembered that, unlike any other section in the Di-
vision, Criminal is reactive, not proactive. It responds to com-
plaints, and depends upon the FBI to investigate the underlying
allegations. Thus, as complaints increase and FBI field work in
civil rights matters improves, the Section's level of activity is
likely to achieve a corresponding increase. According to inter-
views with present and former Section officials, the current in-
crease is attributable more to a combination of improved FBI
work, random chance, and an increase in racial violence than to
any initiative in the Section.
But there are also other reasons of policy behind the Crimi-
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nal Section's relatively high level of activity. On a theoretical
level, this Administration believes that widespread racism is a
thing of the past. As a result, isolated intentional acts of dis-
crimination are viewed as aberrations that deserve to be
punished.
As a practical matter, these cases generally involve isolated
actions by single individuals or small groups, and thus do not
threaten any influential constituencies. If the Section were to at-
tempt, for example, to bring peonage prosecutions against large
landowners, or to try to prosecute police unions or to bring an-
other affirmative Philadelphia-type suit, support for its activi-
ties could likely evaporate.
Finally, the remedies sought in these cases are fully consis-
tent with this Administration's philosophical view of the judici-
ary's role. They are "one-shot" prosecutions of alleged wrongdo-
ers who are convicted and punished, or acquitted. They do not
involve the courts or the Justice Department in the long-term
supervision of the criminal justice system or any other institu-
tions which, the current Division leadership believes, should be
free from federal intrusion.
Given these circumstances, it is no surprise that Assistant
Attorney General Reynolds has chosen to highlight the Criminal
Section as the centerpiece of his civil rights activities. A recent
report by the United States Commission on Civil Rights, how-
ever, provides a disturbing warning. The Commission reported
in June, 1982 that the Section faces "growing problems in ex-
isting areas of its jurisdiction," including "increased Ku Klux
Klan activity," and "widespread violations it believes certain
groups are suffering," which it has not had the resources to in-
vestigate."' Nevertheless, the Justice Department's proposed
Fiscal Year 1983 budget would cut the staff and other resources
available to the Criminal Section, preventing it from making "a
major effort against these violations in FY 1983.'""
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include harassment and discrimination against Hispanics in the Southwest and migrant
workers subject to illegal peonage.
222. Id. at 30 n.88, 36.
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